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THE SOVIET UNION, 1981

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
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In this issue, Soviet foreign policy is closely examined from a military perspective and in an economic and political frame of reference. How have events in Poland affected Soviet relations with the European bloc? What is the status of United States-Soviet relations? Our introductory article points out that "The illusion of Soviet invincibility and United States emasculation appears to be widely accepted, although the real story of Soviet power projection is far more checkered, and although the real potency of United States power remains awesome."

The Soviet Military Reappraised

BY C. G. JACOBSEN

Director of Soviet Studies, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami

THE crumbling of détente has led to a rigidification that has had a strangulating effect on strategic debate.^{1, 2} The dialogue of the deaf between the superpowers finds its domestic corollary in the politicized exclusiveness of American domestic debate. An impartial analysis of strategic realities and/or Soviet policy in this context may be a recipe for oblivion, for it requires a degree of respect for contending schools of thought that most partisans are loath to concede.

The source of the most serious estrangement, between certain advocates of the Reagan administration on the one hand and most traditional pillars of both American Soviet studies and American arms control and strategic studies communities on the other, probably stemmed from the fact that *prima facie* American military responses to asserted military threats were in reality political measures designed to counter political challenges. The military posture appeared too open to dispute on purely military grounds, while fallback resorts to political argument tended on occasion to

¹C. G. Jacobsen, "The Changing American-Soviet Power Balance," *Current History*, October, 1980.

²See George H. Quester, "The Emperor's Clothes, The Kremlin's Armor," and Colin S. Gray "Chacun à son goût," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June/July 1981; also Glenn Buchan's "The Anti-Mad Mythology," *ibid.*, April.

³Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1980* (Leesburg, Virginia: WMSE Publications, 1980); also *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September, 1979, pp. 32-43; January, 1981, pp. 15-22; and March, 1981, esp. pp. 6-18. Note also the annual *Yearbooks* and other publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the publications (*The Military Balance*, *Strategic Survey*, and *Adelphi Papers*) of London's International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

appear superficial or contradictory. The thicket of inconsistencies must be addressed, because it obscures the reality of Soviet capabilities and, equally, because it encourages too confused an image of administration intentions.

The awesome social, economic and human costs of current arms developments must be considered. When President Ronald Reagan took office, world arms budgets already exceeded \$500 billion a year; a million times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb had already been procured and deployed, and this power was continuously augmented through ongoing investments of over \$100 million per day.³ The meaning of these figures was illustrated by a United Nations-sponsored study that calculated what the world's people could have gained with just five percent (one-twentieth!) of this annual sum:

- vaccinations against diseases now killing more than five million children annually;
- the extension of literacy by the end of this century to the 25 percent of the world's adult population that is unable to read or write, and is hence cut off from most sources of knowledge;
- the training of health auxiliaries, barefoot doctors and midwives (these can take care of 85 percent of a third world village's health needs), to service vast rural regions of the less developed world that now have no access to professional medical services;
- the eradicating of the malnutrition that today sees more than 500 million people eating less than the calories needed to sustain ordinary physical activity and that condemns 200 million preschool children to chronic hunger (one out of three

- children die from starvation before reaching the age of 5);
- supplementary feeding for 60 million malnourished pregnant and lactating women to reduce infant mortality drastically.

And there would still be enough money to establish 100 million new school places (250 million new school places are needed within the next half-decade just to keep third world enrollment at the 50 percent level) and to introduce hygienic water supply systems (today water-borne diseases kill 25,000 people every day; such diseases are the most common cause of death among children under 5).⁴

The fact that the Reagan administration nevertheless felt it necessary to proceed with the greatest defense budget increases in United States peacetime history (United States defense outlays were scheduled to reach \$345 billion by 1986), provides graphic testimony to the depth of the new President's security concerns.⁵ Some of America's most prominent economists have warned that this policy will lead to deficits far greater than those once generated by President Lyndon Johnson's decision simultaneously to finance the Vietnam war effort and his domestic Great Society goals—deficits blamed for the inflationary spiral of the 1970's. Nonetheless, the military need was clearly felt to be absolute. Why? The answer derives from perceptions of Soviet strength and expansionism, combined with expectations of future Soviet weakness that might on the surface appear contradictory, but which in fact have led to the fear that Moscow might feel impelled to take advantage of its temporary "window of opportunity."

The 1970's saw the steady emergence and extension of Soviet power. Long-range air and naval capabilities were procured. Soviet capacity and willingness to intervene in distant arenas were made clear by events in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen. And the activities of the Cuban expeditionary corps, the new East German "Afrika Korps," and Vietnamese and other surrogates demonstrated that Moscow could also call on (and support) a complementary spectrum of "alliance" forces.

⁴Information taken from M. Thompson and E. Regehr, *A Time to Disarm*, United Nations' Association in Canada, 1978 (the programs enumerated were in fact calculated to cost \$17.5 billion, which represented five percent of the global arms budget for 1977; since subsequent global arms budgets have risen faster than inflation, one may presume that today's cost would in fact prove lower in percentage terms than that indicated).

⁵See special feature on "Reagan's Defense Buildup," in *Newsweek*, June 8, 1981.

"See E. Ulsamer, "In Focus," *Air Force Magazine*, November, 1980.

⁷C. G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategic Initiatives: Challenge and Response* (New York: Praeger Publishers, October, 1979; 2d ed., February, 1981), traces the development of Soviet theory and capability relevant to distant power projection scenarios.

The quality of Soviet armaments also improved dramatically, both at the strategic and at the conventional level. In the strategic arena, Moscow pushed forward with the deployment of ever more sophisticated MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) missiles. By the end of the 1970's, the Soviet Union was testing missiles with sufficient accuracy to threaten the survivability of the United States land-based Minuteman force; it was also flaunting a silo re-load capability.⁶ In the conventional arena the 1970's saw the emergence of multipurpose all-weather fighter bombers, an array of highly impressive helicopter gunships and troop transports, significantly improved naval hull and armaments technologies, and so on.⁷

Soviet force improvements appeared inexorable, unrelenting. United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) revisions of the true costs of Soviet arms efforts suggested that Soviet investment in both research and procurement had significantly outstripped that of the United States. CIA studies of the late 1970's also projected continuing Soviet economic problems, in particular a severe shortfall in Soviet oil production in the late 1980's. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, though clearly motivated primarily by other considerations, served at the same time to renew an appreciation of the Soviet proximity to Middle East oil fields.

There was a real fear in Washington that a Soviet Union at the apogee of its power and cognizant of negative trends in its domestic economic potential and in the surrounding security environment (in particular the firming up of a Sino-American "alliance" and increased Japanese defense spending) might feel tempted to take preemptive action. At one extreme, some American strategists feared that Moscow might attempt to take out United States land-based forces, calculating that the consequently greater residual Soviet force would suffice to deter United States reprisal; Moscow might gamble that the inevitability of United States city destruction in response to American retaliation would stay a President's hand and lead to the resigned acceptance of Soviet preponderance. At the other extreme, American strategists feared that the acknowledged inability of American forces to match the Soviet force potential against Iranian oil fields (if only because of logistics and geography), might appear to be an irresistibly tempting vacuum by a Moscow confident of its larger force conglomerate's ability to deter escalation.

PREMISES CHALLENGED

Yet all these premises, calculations and fears were open to serious challenge. Although Moscow's overall force structure had seen tremendous improvement during the 1970's and was numerically preponderant in specific categories (like nuclear megatonnage and

the total number of men under arms), the United States retained a distinct advantage in perhaps the most important single quantitative indicator—deliverable warheads.⁸ And while the Soviet Union was in the process of developing technologies that could threaten American silos, the United States had been deploying similar technologies aboard the Minuteman III missiles since the early 1970's.

One might even argue that already existing American prowess in this regard dwarfs Soviet potential, since a far larger proportion of Soviet strategic power continues to be deployed on land (90 percent of Soviet warheads, versus 21 percent of American.) Notwithstanding unquestioned Soviet qualitative strides and the undeniable whittling away of America's technological lead, it is illustrative to note the 1980 testimony of the United States Defense Department's chief scientist, W. J. Perry. Surveying the "Twenty Most Important Areas of Basic Technology," he asserted that there was unchallenged United States superiority in seven, continuing but diminishing United States superiority in five, ascertainable United States-Soviet parity in four, and presumed United States-Soviet parity in the remaining four; he did not concede Soviet advantage in a single area.⁹

The specter of United States land-based missile vulnerability is met with shrugs by some observers, who consider land-based forces to be essentially redundant. Many of the world's most eminent nuclear scientists estimate that existing arsenals already possess as much as 50 times the yield-effect potential needed to destroy the respective societies;¹⁰ as indicated, more than 79 percent of United States warheads (and 50 percent of United States megatonnage) are deployed on less vulnerable sea- and air-based delivery vehicles.¹¹ It is also pointed out that new accuracy technologies, combined with the fact that most submarines can afford to surface to double-check

⁸Ibid; see also SIPRI Yearbook 1981, and "Special Report on the Military Sector," in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June, 1980.

⁹W. J. Perry's statement in United States Senate, *Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1980* (96th Congress, first session), part 4, p. 43.

¹⁰See H. L. Geiger, "The Illusion of Survival" and M. Shuman, "The Mouse that Roared," in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June/July, 1981, pp. 16-19 and January, 1981, pp. 15-22 respectively; also K. N. Lewis, "The Prompt and Delayed Effects of Nuclear War," *Scientific American*, July, 1979.

¹¹See Frank Barnaby's "World Arsenals in 1980," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September, 1980.

¹²Note Andrew Cockburn and Alexander Cockburn, "The Myth of Missile Accuracy," the *New York Review of Books*, November 20, 1980, pp. 40-43.

¹³See *International Security*, Winter, 1979/80; articles by Lord Mountbatten and Richard Garwin.

¹⁴Text of acceptance speech by George Kennan on receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize in Washington on May 19, 1981; see the *Guardian*, May 25, 1981.

and fine tune targeting coordinates, mean that land-based forces no longer enjoy a monopoly on precision-targeting options.

Richard Garwin (distinguished alumnus of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Defense Science Board) and others claim that theoretical accuracies are in any case deceiving.¹² To date, accuracy data result from extensive calibrations of gyroscopes and accelerometers over Pacific testing ranges. But hostile trajectories would encounter gravitational and atmospheric phenomena different from those that the gyroscopes and accelerometers have been programmed to counter. The consequent discrepancy between theoretical and real accuracy may be minor (and would certainly not affect counter-city targeting), but it might have a very considerable effect on counter-silo designs. It is little wonder that skepticism abounds, considering the awesome (some would say insurmountable) practical problems of coordinating and guaranteeing the exquisitely timed impact on widely dispersed targets of such numbers of missiles originating from the diverse firing locales involved in first-strike scenarios.

On the subject of redundancy there is the point made by Lord Solly Zuckerman (the former British government science adviser), Lord Louis Mountbatten and others that just one of the now older Polaris-Poseidon-type submarines can deliver as much explosive power as was employed by all the combatants of World War II put together.¹³ For insurance purposes, one might want two, or five (or even ten?). But even that number is almost infinitesimal in the context of today's arsenals.

Then there are those whose skepticism was nurtured by earlier fears of Soviet advantage, the specter of the mythical Soviet bomber squadrons of the 1950's and the missile gap myth of the early 1960's, and who remember President Eisenhower's somber warning about the dynamics and dangers that attend the establishment of a military-industrial complex. In the words of perhaps the most prominent American Sovietologist, Ambassador George Kennan (former Ambassador to the Soviet Union):

the present Soviet and American arsenals . . . are simply fantastically redundant to the purpose in question . . . something well less than 20 percent of these stocks would surely suffice for the most sanguine concepts of deterrence . . .

. . . they have, of course, their share of the blame. . . . But we must remember that it has been we Americans who, at almost every step of the road, have taken the lead in the development of this sort of weaponry. It was we who first produced and tested such a device; we who were the first to raise its destructiveness to a new level with the hydrogen bomb; we who introduced the multiple warhead; we who have declined every proposal for the renunciation of the principle of "first use"; and we alone, so help us God, who have used the weapon in anger against others, and against tens of thousands of helpless noncombatants at that.¹⁴

The CIA data of the late 1970's have been the subject of much criticism. There is no question that Soviet defense budgets continued to grow through the decade of the 1970's, though the growth of Soviet gross national product (GNP) may have been commensurate; in other words, the relative burden on the Soviet economy may have remained fairly steady. The dispute concerns the politically appointed B-team's report, which doubled the CIA analysts' estimate of the real Soviet burden.¹⁵ The doubling became the base for subsequent and current calculations and is responsible for the figures that show absolute Soviet outlays to be greater than those of the United States and the relative burden on the Soviet economy to be twice as heavy as it is in the United States.¹⁶ This image, obviously, has been a crucial factor in American fears.

What is less appreciated is the fact that the B-team did not double American estimates of the size and potency of the Soviet armed forces; they did not find new and previously overlooked Soviet armies, navies, strategic rocket troops and the like. They only doubled estimates of the relative cost of the existing forces. But the actual real cost to the Soviet economy remained unchanged. It was only the American appreciation of what this cost represented that was revised so sharply upward. In effect, the new estimates declared that the Soviet military economy was only half as efficient as previously thought, scarcely cause for sudden alarm.

Furthermore, all the CIA estimates, including the

¹⁵CIA, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970-75*, May, 1976; and see A.M. Cox, "Why the U.S. Since 1977 Has Been Misperceiving Soviet Military Strength," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1980.

¹⁶One should note that even if one accepts "B-team" figures for Soviet defense spending, total NATO expenditures still exceed total Warsaw Pact expenditures by a considerable margin (and have done so every year since 1970). See table in "NATO Outspends Warsaw," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June/July 1981; also *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1978*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and former United States Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's final *Report to Congress*, January, 1981.

¹⁷See especially F.D. Holzman's "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the US on Defense?" *International Security*, Spring, 1980; and J. O'Grady's "The CIA and the Soviet Military Budget: Who's Fooling Who?" *Defense Monitor*, special issue, summer, 1981.

¹⁸CIA report, September, 1980; see discussion in the *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), March 25, 1981; and note "Soviet Energy Options and United States Interests," *Quarterly Report*, Mershon Center, O.S.U., summer, 1980. On July 8, 1981, the United States Defense Analysis Agency reported that Soviet energy prospects appear "highly favorable" and that the Soviet Union will meet its production goals in the 1980's, referring to the late 1980 Soviet discovery of a major new oil field in western Siberia. (See *The New York Times*, September 3, 1981.) For the CIA's original pessimistic analysis, see "Prospects for Soviet Oil Production, A Supplemental Analysis," CIA ER77-10425, July, 1977.

earlier ones that presumed greater Soviet military economic efficiency, have been attacked on methodological grounds. CIA methodology, especially with regard to aggregation of economic indices and categories, is said to contain an inherent and inevitable upward bias.¹⁷ If the powerful arguments to this effect are indeed correct, then a certain downward revision of one's estimate of the Soviet defense burden becomes mandatory—whether one concurs with the B-team view of Soviet inefficiencies or not.

Finally, with regard to CIA projection of significant Soviet energy shortfalls during the 1980's, one must note that subsequent CIA reports have in fact been far less alarmist (there are those who believe that while Soviet leaders might ignore their own economists' pessimistic prognoses, they do not belittle CIA expertise; it is suggested that the original CIA report may in fact have been a decisive spur to the program of energy mix shift, extraction improvements, invigorated exploration and conservation that now appears to have eased the situation!).¹⁸ The point of the matter relates to the contention that the Soviet economy is severely strained by the existing defense burden, and that it therefore would not be able to match a new surge in American defense spending. The suggestion that a great increase in United States outlays might literally break Moscow's ability to compete found frequent expression in the Republican election entourage of 1980. Skeptics pointed out that Moscow sustained far greater efforts on far shakier economic grounds in decades past. Yet there was the riposte that Soviet economic growth was stagnating by the late 1970's even with still buoyant energy production; and the presumed imminent loss of this latter conjured up the possibility of prolonged economic crisis.

But the picture looks very different if one proceeds from a less extreme assumption about the relative Soviet defense burden, if one acknowledges that the 1979-1980 nadir of Soviet economic growth was affected at least somewhat by the shock of two successive abominable harvests (1981 harvest prospects look far better), and if one concedes a less troublesome Soviet energy outlook. Economic problems and perhaps sometime suffering, yes, but neither Soviet nor Russian history supports the expectation that Moscow's defense commitment will abate.

(Continued on page 336)

C. G. Jacobsen is director of Soviet Studies at the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, and Adjunct Professor of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. A frequent government consultant, his most recent books are *Soviet Strategic Initiatives: Challenge and Response* and *Sino-Soviet Relations Since Mao; The Chairman's Legacy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979 and 1981, respectively).

In the 1980's, the Soviet Union fears "encirclement: a new alliance comprised of the United States, China, Japan and West Europe," writes this specialist, who notes that "Moscow must also soberly consider how to deal with an American administration that has placed Soviet-American relations at the heart of its foreign policy, but which seems determined to approach these relations from a 'position of strength.'"

The Soviet Union and the United States

BY WILLIAM G. HYLAND

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

THE invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, seems destined to rank as one of the watersheds of postwar relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was not only that the Soviet Union used its own armed forces, but that Afghanistan was outside the East European periphery of the U.S.S.R., where the world had unfortunately become accustomed to Soviet interventions. There was also the fact that the invasion came after two major Soviet interventions with Cuban "proxy" forces, suggesting a potential pattern of belligerence. And, finally, there was the fact that there was still a measure of détente, as embodied in the SALT II treaty that had been signed just six months earlier and was still pending in the United States Senate.

The American reaction struck at two major elements of "détente": mutual economic interests and a mutual interest in arms control. President Jimmy Carter focused on both these aspects by ordering an embargo on American grain sales and shipments to the U.S.S.R. and announcing that he would not press the ratification of the SALT II treaty (the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) that he had signed with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev. In addition, President Carter symbolized the American condemnation of the U.S.S.R. by promoting a boycott of the summer, 1980, Olympic games in Moscow.

More tangibly, the Carter administration broadened its China policy; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China and declared that the United States and China had parallel defense interests; a return visit was arranged for the Chinese defense minister. The net result, at least as far as Moscow was concerned, was that the United States was moving a

step closer to outright support of China's military effort.

The Soviet reaction was predictably shrill. Brezhnev accused the United States of undermining détente and exacerbating the international situation —a rather standard charge. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned that playing the China card was a "risky game." The more authoritative pronouncement signaling a shift in the Soviet position came at the party's central committee plenary meeting in June, 1980, which devoted most of its attention to foreign policy, in addition to announcing the dates and agenda of the twenty-sixth party congress.

The June plenum featured a short speech by Brezhnev, in which he only touched on some major themes, an unpublished "report" by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and a final resolution laying out the general guidelines for the post-Afghan period.¹ The plenum resolution was straightforward in its conclusions and recommendations, with a call to increase the Soviet defense effort; a warning of the dangers in the United States-Chinese rapprochement; and a commitment of sorts to maintain détente. In short, Soviet leaders began to see the possibility of a more profound shift in American policy and to take some precautionary steps, but without enunciating a new basic foreign policy line.

One reason for this hesitation was uncertainty about the American election campaign, not only about its outcome, but also about which candidate might best serve Soviet interests. Early in the campaign, before the primaries had gone very far, Soviet leaders called Republican candidate Ronald Reagan a "double dyed reactionary,"² but as the future President's candidacy gained in credibility Soviet leaders were more circumspect. American visitors were told of Soviet perplexity over Reagan.³ Brezhnev publicly described the international situation as "rather complicated" in late August, but added reassuringly that

one should believe that sooner or later United States leaders too will again come to . . . [the] conclusion [that they could not deal with the Soviet Union from positions of strength].⁴

¹The plenum documents are printed in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, Soviet Union*, June 24, 1980, p. R1.

²*Soviet World Outlook (SWO)*, vol. 5, no. 8 (August 15, 1980), pp. 2-3.

³Leslie H. Gelb, "Soviet Strategic Choices," *The New York Times*, July 10, 1980.

⁴Tass, "Leonid Brezhnev on the International Situation," speech at Alma Ata, August 29, 1980. Soviet Embassy, Information Department.

Soviet resentment of President Carter was obvious in Soviet propaganda, but Soviet leaders did not noticeably warm to the Reagan candidacy.

In keeping with Leninist orthodoxy, the Soviet leaders drew little distinction between candidates, even if privately they had their prejudices and preferences. *Izvestia*, for example, claimed in September that the two candidates "have erased their last distinguishing features and have been transformed into political twins."⁵

WAITING FOR REAGAN

In any case, once the election was over the Soviets reverted to a familiar pattern: pointed gestures and overtures toward the President-elect. Since the death of Joseph Stalin, all American Presidents have been subjected to this same treatment, a general offer to wipe the slate clean. Thus, on the eve of the anniversary of the October revolution, Soviet Premier Nikolai Tikhonov said that the Soviet leaders would like to hope that the new United States administration would display a constructive approach to "questions of relations between our countries."⁶ For its part, he insisted, the Soviet Union was motivated by a "high sense of responsibility"; the U.S.S.R. was not affected by "time-serving fluctuations," and was thus "prepared to reach an understanding." On November 18 Brezhnev said that any "constructive steps" taken by the administration would meet a "positive reaction." Nevertheless, the Soviet approach was more cautious than usual. The election was portrayed more as a defeat for Carter than as a victory for Reagan; Reagan was treated as an ambiguous figure, who might face the realities of the international situation but might actually worsen United States-Soviet relations.

The wait and see position gradually assumed more pessimistic overtones: an ominous strain in Soviet commentary became more pronounced. On the eve of President Reagan's inauguration, a long article appeared under the name of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who seemed slightly to soften the Soviet position by holding open the possibility that SALT talks might resume even if there were no ratification of the SALT II treaty; similarly, Gromyko hinted at a softening of the Soviet terms for negotiating on the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) plan for deploying new missiles in Europe.⁷

In short, Soviet leaders had covered all their options: whichever direction the new President took, the Soviet leaders could claim they had foreseen it and

prepared for it. In fact, there was probably considerable uncertainty and apprehension in Moscow—especially because within a month after the inauguration Soviet leaders would convene their party congress, where major lines of policy should normally be laid down by the general secretary.

THE TWENTY-SIXTH PARTY CONGRESS

By February 26, 1981, when the congress opened, the problems with the United States were growing. During February, acerbic statements by leading American figures had drawn Soviet rebuttals and counterfire. Despite some rumbling in the propaganda organs, however, the thrust of Brezhnev's performance at the party congress was conciliatory. He unfurled a new eight-point peace program, but the remarks that caught public attention concerned his interest in a summit meeting with the President.

The summit gambit was a shrewd one, catching the United States by surprise. Brezhnev was appealing to the inherent political attractiveness that summit meetings have always held for American Presidents. But such a meeting so early in the life of an administration might serve more than symbolic purposes. President Carter had virtually frozen relations; thus if Brezhnev met Reagan this meeting would have the political and psychological effect of cancelling out the Carter retaliatory measures and returning to the pre-Afghanistan status quo. Lifting the grain embargo might take place at the summit. Moreover, given the new administration's skepticism over SALT, an early summit might serve as a bridge between formal American ratification of the SALT II treaty and a tacit continuation of its provisions. In short, at the summit Brezhnev could set a more conciliatory tone and perhaps head off a harsher American course.

But after some fumbling and hesitation, the Reagan administration realized that an unstructured summit would have atmospherics as its principal achievement. At first Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. said that the Brezhnev proposals contained "new and remarkable innovations" and that the United States was "very interested in examining them." A more considered reaction, however, soon appeared, and it was notable for the revival of the strategy of "linkage." Haig called for modification in Soviet conduct and a "climate of greater reciprocity and restraint"; he characterized summity as a special form of diplomacy that required careful and detailed preparations, a view that was ascribed to President Reagan:

It should not be undertaken unless the prospects for success and the outcome of such summity is promising . . . Merely to have heads of state and government meet just to be meeting or to have such meetings result in confrontation is—and we've had experience with this in the past—perhaps self-defeating in the extreme, and we intend to avoid it.⁸

Thus the first sortie in Soviet-American rapproche-

⁵SWO, October 15, 1980, p. 2.

⁶R. W. Apple, Jr., "Soviet Affirms Readiness to Discuss Arms Control," *The New York Times*, November 7, 1980.

⁷Tass, January 19, 1981. "Andrei Gromyko on U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy," Soviet Embassy Information Department.

⁸U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Haig's Press Conference," February 27, 1981.

ment collapsed, as the Soviets had probably anticipated. If there were to be no dramatic first meeting, the relationship would have to revolve more around substance than form.

Soviet leaders eventually indicated their chagrin and irritation at the failure of their peace offensive. At first, the party congress line was emphasized: "peace had been preserved" was a prominent theme, and the leitmotiv of the Soviet congress was to continue the struggle to "strengthen and deepen the relaxation of tensions." But gradually the slight optimism engendered by the congress began to fade and a harsher tone returned. At the end of President Reagan's first 100 days, Soviet leaders were claiming to see no overall picture and no coherent United States foreign policy, except for a desire to accelerate the arms race and switch relations with the Soviet Union to confrontation.

Ironically, the lifting of the grain embargo apparently had little effect. By early May, 1981, the new tougher Soviet line was solidifying: Secretary Haig's speeches were attacked as "rabid anti-Sovietism and anticommunism," a precursor of what was to become a new and harsh denunciation of the United States and a blatant attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies on the complex issue of theater nuclear weapons (TNF) negotiations.

ARMS CONTROL

With SALT talks in abeyance, Soviet leaders concentrated on preventing the implementation of the NATO decision of December, 1979, to deploy 572 new American missiles, including 108 of the longer-range Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 new ground-launched cruise missiles, beginning about 1983. Soviet leaders had themselves to blame for this turn of events: it was their major buildup of a new intermediate-range SS-20 missile, with three separate MIRVed* warheads, that provided the impetus and rationale for the NATO decision. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders have made a major diplomatic effort to preserve their own SS-20 force, which had grown to about 250 launchers by mid-1981, and to slow down if not stop the NATO counterarmament.

Until the mid-1970's, the role of Europe in Soviet military strategy appeared to be fairly straightforward: Europe was a hostage against American conduct and policy. Faced with a massive American strategic superiority, the Soviet Union could compensate in Europe by exploiting its preponderance in conventional ground forces, and by deploying a large

theater missile force. For 20 years, Soviet leaders were able to brandish a force of about 700 MRBM's and IRBM's.** Whatever the United States-Soviet central strategic balance might be, Europe was nevertheless under an ambiguous Soviet nuclear threat from weapons that could not conceivably threaten the United States.

This regional imbalance was to a great extent academic. It gave some credibility to Soviet coercive diplomacy during the Berlin crises of 1958-1962, but there was a strong, continuing belief that the Soviet Union was in fact deterred from resorting to nuclear use in the European theater. The United States could counter with theater forces or escalate to intermediate-range weapons, or even threaten to use central systems. This was both the theory and the reality.

Despite a certain technical obsolescence, the Soviet intermediate-range force was reduced only slightly throughout the 1960's. And in this early period, Soviet arms control policy for theater weapons was transparent but persistent. Nuclear weapons were to be banned in Central Europe and in the Baltic and in the Balkans and the Indian Ocean; nuclear free zones would encircle the U.S.S.R., but Soviet forces capable of reaching into and beyond these zones would be immune.

Western concern over Soviet theater forces began to recede in the 1960's, however, even though the balances remained highly favorable to Moscow. SALT and prior political negotiations, especially the German treaties and the MBFR negotiations†, served to mitigate fears and concerns about the strategic balance in Europe. The United States had a large tactical air force available to NATO, and the United States also reassigned a large number of warheads from its sea-based SLBM‡ force to European control through SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). The progress of "détente" seemed to lessen the worries over the lack of Western forces that could actually "balance" Soviet missiles and bomber forces in European Russia. Events finally intruded on this relative lethargy:

- Most important, of course, was the growing recognition in Europe that there was a strategic "equilibrium" between the superpowers that inevitably made regional balances far more sensitive and precarious;
- It was also becoming apparent that United States theater forces were being dragged into the SALT II negotiations, albeit haphazardly, in the various proposed bargains about American cruise missiles and Soviet Backfire bombers.

In 1976-1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20, a new, light, solid-fuel missile designed for mobility—in effect a qualitative leap forward. The

*Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles.

**Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.

†Mutual Balanced Force Reduction.

‡Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles.

SS-20 was a logical progression: whereas the European theater had once compensated for Soviet weaknesses, it now offered certain offensive advantages. As strategic parity was achieved, the Soviet Union's theater force assumed a new role. Large Soviet theater forces could theoretically neutralize NATO's resort to the escalatory ladder. The SS-20 was not only more survivable but also more accurate; thus it offered several new targeting options to the Soviets. No American weapons system stationed in Europe could threaten the SS-20. NATO was inevitably led to consider new theater systems to redress both the military and psychological balance.

The NATO decision of December, 1979, was highly vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. Its political underpinnings were weak; the Germans contrived a scheme to soften the impact of their own decision by virtually giving a veto to Belgium and the Netherlands, two nations beset with internal political problems. And the link between deployments and negotiations with the East was too strong; deployments could not be easily undertaken so long as negotiations held some promise.

The Soviet campaign was almost a classic. At first there were dire threats interspersed with vague hints that the issues might be negotiable. Even before the signing of SALT II, Brezhnev called for talks about medium-range missiles (in March, 1979).⁹ But with SALT II in hand, Gromyko speculated that folding medium-range missiles into SALT III might so complicate the talks that they would take seven or eight years, thus extending beyond the time frame of SALT II. As NATO moved toward a decision, Brezhnev announced the withdrawal of 20,000 troops and some tanks from East Germany and offered to "reduce the number of medium-range nuclear means" if the NATO deployment was completely stopped. Then Gromyko insisted that if NATO made a decision to deploy, it would "destroy" the basis for any negotiations.

Soviet leaders claimed that the NATO decision had to be revoked or at least "officially suspended." But after West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June, 1980, the new Soviet position held that talks could begin "even before" the ratification of SALT II; in those talks, both missiles and American forward-based systems would have to be discussed "simultaneously" and in an "organic connection." The Soviet Union publicly dropped any consideration of British and French forces as a "concession." In short, Soviet leaders tried three different

⁹Soviet and Western statements can be found in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs: "The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," December 31, 1980.

¹⁰L.I. Brezhnev, *Report of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the 26th Congress*. Novosti, pamphlet in English, pp. 21-22.

tactics: to force the immediate cancellation of the NATO decision; to establish cancellation as a precondition to negotiations; or to demand cancellation to accompany United States-Soviet bilateral discussion outside the "framework" of SALT III. Finally, the Soviet Union dropped its preconditions and entered negotiations in October, 1980, no doubt in part worried about a Reagan election victory and the demise of SALT.

In general, Soviet leaders argued: (1) there is a military-strategic equilibrium between the two blocs; (2) the United States, nonetheless, is trying to "correct" this balance through military deployments in various regional balances; and (3) NATO's decision to deploy new missiles is not routine modernization, but the creation of a "qualitatively new threat," i.e., an effort to change the strategic situation in Europe in NATO's favor.

It follows (as the argument proceeds) that the Soviet Union cannot tolerate this; thus it offers two choices: (1) to reach a contractual confirmation of the existing state of military parity, i.e., through negotiation that could limit or even reduce "very considerably" medium-range missiles and American forward-based systems but without upsetting the established military balance; or (2) a new European arms race.

As for the linkage between theater nuclear force (TNF) negotiations and the fate of SALT, the Soviet tactic has been to substitute TNF negotiations for SALT, a position that has found some support in West Europe. Thus at the party congress Brezhnev more or less accepted the failure of SALT II per se, while urging negotiations to preserve the "positive elements" of SALT. He shifted his emphasis to the European theater, where he proposed to extend the "confidence-building measures" to European Russia and introduced a missile moratorium, while adding a "qualitative" moratorium as well.¹⁰

Brezhnev modified his position in July, 1981, in talks with former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, suggesting that "preparations" but not actual

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William G. Hyland served in the United States government from 1954 through 1977; in 1969, he joined the National Security Council staff at the White House, and in 1973 he was appointed director of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. In 1975, he was appointed by President Gerald Ford to be deputy assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; he retired in 1977 and became a Senior Fellow of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. He is a coauthor of *The Fall of Khrushchev* (New York: Funk & Wagnall, 1968.)

"Soviet support for the Arab confrontation states has been openhanded and consistent, enabling them to oppose the Camp David peace process, the Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation, and the United States quest for military bases in the area."

The Soviet Presence in the Arab World

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

THE basic policy of the Soviet Union toward the three principal sectors of the Arab world—the Arab-Israeli, the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula, and the North African—has continued unchanged during the past year or so. Despite its continuing military intervention in Afghanistan, anxiety over the simmering crisis in Poland, uncertainty in relations with the United States, and serious economic difficulties at home, the Soviet Union shows no diminution of interest in improving its position in the Arab world and in undermining United States policy there. It demonstrates caution, persistence and a readiness to expand commitments to the extent necessary for forging closer ties with prized Arab clients.

Over the past generation, Soviet interests in the Arab world have changed strikingly. In the late 1940's and 1950's they were primarily defensive, geared to weaken the military network of interlocking alliances that the United States was creating to contain the Soviet Union; by the 1960's and 1970's, in response to local conditions and growing Soviet power, Soviet interests became more ambitious and expansionist in character. The underlying rationale was strategic. However, Soviet interest in each sector of the Arab world developed independently, responding to a changing combination of security considerations, regional dynamics and rivalry with the United States. What is likely for the 1980's is a sustained Soviet effort to pursue a "forward policy" throughout the Arab East.

Several generalizations about the continuities and changes in Soviet policy in the Arab world can be derived from the U.S.S.R.'s overall record.¹ The continuities are conspicuous. First, the Soviet Union pursues a differentiated policy that is sensitive to constraints and opportunities. The selection of targets, the composition of aid packages, the willingness to subordinate Soviet desires to a courted country's preferences and the businesslike fashion in which

most agreements have been carried out, irrespective of occasional policy disagreements, bespeak a sound perception of priorities and approach. Like Premier Nikita Khrushchev, President Leonid Brezhnev has managed to accommodate to the mutual contentiousness of the Muslim rivals. Thus, he has maintained good relations with both sides in the quagmires of Arab politics, for example, in quarrels between Syria and Iraq, Iraq and Iran (a Muslim but not Arab state), the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and Kuwait and Iraq.

Second, strategic considerations and not ideological preferences have shaped Soviet diplomacy. Neither the Shah's conservatism, Sadat's de-Nasserization, Qadaffi's brand of fundamentalism, nor Yasir Arafat's unpredictable violence has deterred Moscow's quest for closer ties.* In all instances, local Communists have been expendable.

Third, the Soviet Union has been a reliable patron-protector. It shielded prime clients from defeat at the hands of their pro-United States opponents, even though this at times required Moscow to give way to a client's desires and often resulted in unwanted tensions with the United States. The U.S.S.R. re-equipped the Egyptian and Syrian armies after the 1967 June War; protected Nasser in 1969-1970 during the war of attrition along the Suez Canal; backed Sadat in the 1973 October War; and acquiesced in Syria's military intervention in Lebanon in 1976.

The Iraqi-Iranian war that started on September 22, 1980, has sorely tried the allegiances of the Soviet Union in its efforts to play the role of "honest broker" and to uphold, minimally, its commitment to Iraq in line with the 1972 friendship treaty, while at the same time trying to improve relations with Iran. Though linked by treaty to Iraq, Moscow senses that the larger, economically more important and strategically pivotal Iran could well fall into its waiting grasp; so it moves carefully, trying to retain leverage over both countries.

Fourth, Moscow has not been averse to intensifying local arms races. It knows that arms are its principal attraction for anti-Western Arab leaders. Whatever political leverage and military advantage it can obtain

*Iranian Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Libyan leader Muammar Qadaffi and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat.

¹For elaboration, see the author's "The Evolution of Soviet Strategy in the Middle East," *Orbis*, vol. 24, no. 2 (Summer, 1980), pp. 332-337.

from Arab clients derive from its ability to provide them with the weapons they need to retain power and thwart their United States-backed rivals.

Finally, running through Soviet policy and interest in the Arab East is the central aim of eroding the United States position and influence. There is no confusion in Moscow: the United States is the Soviet Union's main adversary. Moreover, the Soviets correctly conclude that the United States aim is to keep them out of the region. Accordingly, derangement of the American position, not rapprochement, is the key to Soviet strategy in the Arab world.

Apart from these continuities in Soviet behavior, the new dimensions in Moscow's policy that have emerged clearly since the October War deserve brief mention. First, the Soviet Union has shown a greater ability and readiness to project military power into areas of opportunity. Soviet involvement in Ethiopia, Angola and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 all brought political advantage to Moscow's clients.

The U.S.S.R. is now in an excellent position, militarily as well as geographically, to exploit future upheavals and regional conflicts. A recently published British defense study stressed that the Soviet Union is "plainly ready to apply force in support of political aims" and that it uses the formidable military power at its disposal to exploit unrest in the world.² The Soviet Union's confidence in its military might, its conviction that the "correlation of forces" favors the Soviet bloc, its perception of United States self-doubt and the domestic fetters on Washington's ability to turn to the military option, and its toleration of the variability of Arab political allegiances, all tend to reinforce the position of Soviet leaders who urge greater boldness in situations of opportunity.

A second important change, a direct result of the greatly increased Soviet military capability, is Moscow's pursuit of a slightly more venturesome policy than heretofore. Moscow is running higher risks for regional gain, accepting the international costs and consequences, and doing so irrespective of the effect on its relationship with the United States. (The case of Afghanistan is a prime example.)

Moscow is playing a shrewd game of diplomatic roulette in the Arab world. Like a seasoned gambler, it backs several numbers at the same time, hoping to parlay a small stake into a big payoff and prevent the United States from coming out ahead. Its general approach relates to the specific circumstances that it faces in each of the three sectors of the Arab world.

SYRIA

With the exception of the period from 1958 to 1961, when Syria merged with Egypt to form the short-lived United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union and Syria have had an active and ongoing relationship since the

²Quoted in *The Baltimore Sun*, April 16, 1981, p. 6.

mid-1950's. Syria attracted strong Soviet support for several reasons: its resistance to membership in any Western-sponsored military pact; its radical, secular political aims and opposition to West-leaning Arab monarchies; its bitter opposition to the state of Israel; its strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean; and its pro-Moscow Communist party. In 1967, Moscow's interest in Syria led it to exaggerate the threat of an Israeli attack and inadvertently to trigger the sequence of events that culminated in the Arab-Israeli war and crushing defeat for the Arabs.

After the June War, Moscow became deeply involved in the military buildup and preparations of Syria (as well as Egypt). Soviet advisers trained the Syrian armed forces, modernized their tactics, and prepared them for the October War. During the war, the Soviets supplied the Syrians, served in various capacities on the battlefield, and shielded them from another defeat by the Israelis.

The falling out between Egypt and Syria over Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's turn from Moscow to Washington and his willingness to negotiate a settlement with Israel had the effect of nudging Syria into closer alignment with the Soviet Union. In March, 1976, Sadat unilaterally abrogated the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty, effectively ending Soviet influence in Egypt. To offset this defeat, Moscow supplied Syria with enormous quantities of advanced weaponry and openly encouraged the anti-Sadat Arab coalition that Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) worked to forge. Opposition to Sadat's policy of seeking an end to the debilitating and costly cycle of Arab-Israeli wars was made possible by Soviet arms, with which Moscow sought to make itself indispensable to the Arab confrontation states and to entrench its position in the Arab world.

Over the years, liberal Soviet economic aid has been important to Syria, which is dotted with Soviet-built projects, like the Euphrates Dam, a major undertaking comparable to the help it gave Egypt with the Aswan High Dam. In addition, Soviet specialists charted the country geologically, discovering deposits of iron and manganese.

However, relations between Moscow and Damascus were never without problems. Domestically, the dominant Baath party of Syrian President Hafez Assad refused the Communists any significant role in Syrian politics, and Assad felt threatened by Communist opposition to his periodic attempts at reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. Politically, Assad refused to grant Moscow the full use of military bases in Latakia and Tartus, and he resisted Soviet importuning to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. And diplomatically, Moscow was cool to Assad's flirtation with the United States and his ambitions in Lebanon.

Tensions developed over Syria's invasion of Leba-

non on May 31-June 1, 1976, in support of the Christian forces and against the PLO and the Lebanese Left. *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, castigated Syria's action, calling it "a knife in the back" of the Palestinians.³ Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, who visited Damascus on the eve of the Syrian intervention, found himself confronted with a fait accompli. For a time, Moscow halted arms shipments as a sign of dissatisfaction, but resumed them after Assad's visit in early 1977, obviously backing away from a showdown that might jeopardize Soviet relations with Syria and lead to an Egyptian-style expulsion of Soviet personnel.⁴ Though dissonance over Lebanon and arms shipments persisted, Syria and the Soviet Union were drawn together by their opposition to Egypt and the United States.

Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November, 1977, the ensuing Camp David peace process, and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty on March 26, 1979, led Moscow and Damascus to mute their disagreements. The anti-Sadat Steadfastness Front, whose natural leader is Syria, assures Moscow of a convenient link to the Arab-Israeli dispute, though Soviet leaders want Arab opposition to remain political rather than military.

Growing domestic opposition stemming from ethnic and religious sectarianism has forced Assad into a closer political relationship with Moscow. Assad's tightly knit, secretive leadership is primarily Alawite, members of a Shiite Muslim sect representing only about 10 percent of the Syrian population, which is predominantly Sunni, the orthodox mainstream of the Islamic religion. The military high command, the praetorian secret police, and the all-powerful Regional Command of the Baath party are controlled by the Alawites. Assad's rule has been plagued also, in recent years, by widespread corruption, economic difficulties and growing dissatisfaction with the cost of sustaining a 30,000-man army of occupation in Lebanon.

On October 8, 1980, Assad gave the Kremlin the treaty it had sought for almost a decade. In Moscow, the U.S.S.R. and Syria signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation, effective December 2, 1980. Similar in the main to Soviet pacts with Iraq (April 9, 1972), Somalia (July 11, 1974), Afghanistan (December 5, 1978), and the PDRY (October 25, 1979), the treaty has something for each party.⁵

A few key provisions may be noted. Article 5 calls for "regular consultations," but does not elaborate. Article 6 says that in the event of "situations

³*Pravda*, July 16, 1976.

⁴Robert Rand, "Assad in Moscow," Radio Liberty Research, RL 217/78 (October 5, 1978), p. 2.

⁵For the text of the treaty, see *Foreign Broadcast Information Service/U.S.S.R. International Affairs*, October 9, 1980, H6-H8.

⁶*Middle-East Intelligence Survey*, vol. 8, no. 14 (October 16-31, 1980), p. 111.

jeopardizing peace or security of one of the parties, or creating a threat to peace," both sides "shall enter without delay into contact with each other with a view to coordinating their positions and to cooperating in order to remove the threat that has arisen." Article 7 calls on the two parties to cooperate "in assuring conditions for the preservation and development of the social and economic accomplishments of their peoples." According to one well-informed source,

this article represents a Soviet commitment to aid Assad's regime in the event of a "reactionary rebellion" on the part of either the Muslim Brotherhood or a rightist faction.⁶

Article 10 provides for continued cooperation in the military field.

The Soviet-Syrian relationship is complicated, and it is not easy to make a clear-cut assessment of its costs and benefits. Assad has apparently gained the following: assurance from the U.S.S.R. of support in the event of a war with Israel over Lebanon (for example, Moscow has denounced Israel and strongly supported Syria's position in the crisis over the April, 1981, Syrian deployment of surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley); help, if needed, to suppress domestic opponents; backing for Syria's opposition to the Camp David peace process; and assistance (or at least benevolent neutrality) in the event of trouble with Iraq, with whom relations deteriorated in the wake of the failure of the 1979 unity talks, or with Jordan, who backs Iraq in the Iraqi-Iranian war, in which Syria sides with Iran.

Moscow's advantages are the following: access to Syrian port facilities; prestige in the Arab world as a consequence of having finally persuaded Syria to conclude a friendship treaty; support by a leading Muslim country on the issue of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; and a decreased likelihood that Syria will effect a reconciliation with the United States.

Syria remains Moscow's principal partner in the Arab-Israeli sector of the Middle East. Their mutual interest in the stability and survival of the anti-United States Baathist leadership gives the countries a reason for continued cooperation.

SOUTH YEMEN

There is much talk about Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula region of the Arab world, especially after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979, brought Soviet troops to within 300 miles of the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean. However, most Arab countries in this sector of the Middle East are potential rather than actual targets of opportunity, with the exception of Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which has had extensive experience with the Soviet Union.

Moscow recognized the new government of South

Yemen, as the PDRY was initially known, immediately on its establishment on November 30, 1967. Support developed slowly, and chiefly as a reaction to China's efforts. Thus, in 1971, Soviet aid totaled less than \$30 million annually. The watershed in the U.S.S.R.-PDRY relationship was the visit of PDRY President Rubbayi Ali to the Soviet Union in November, 1972.

Fearful that the neighboring conservative regimes in Saudi Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and Oman might seek to depose it, the PDRY's Marxist government (the only one in the Arab world) sought a closer connection with Moscow. It also wanted backing for the insurrection it was generating in the Dhofar province of Oman. Defense Minister Ali Nasir Mohammad's visit to Moscow in March, 1973, resulted in a substantial increase in Soviet military aid and greater Soviet involvement in oil exploration, party-to-party exchanges, and economic activities. The more radical the PDRY's policy became, the more isolated it became in the Arab world, and the more the PDRY's leadership was forced to rely on Moscow.

With the failure of the Dhofari rebellion by 1976 (largely because the Shah of Iran interceded on the side of the beleaguered Sultan of Oman), Saudi Arabia started to dangle financial subsidies before Rubbayi Ali, hoping to wean him away from the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, Moscow reacted by intriguing with his more doctrinaire colleague and key rival, Fatah Ismail.

Rubbayi Ali's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia and unity talks with the Yemen Arab Republic ended when the latter's President, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, was assassinated in the fall of 1977, two days before he was due in Aden for reunification talks. In June, 1978, a series of arcane and bloody events brought Fatah Ismail to power and cost Rubbayi Ali his life. The Soviet role in these developments remains a matter for speculation.

Under Fatah Ismail, the pro-Moscow Marxist-Leninist faction gained control over the United Political Organization/National Front, the umbrella organization established in October, 1975, to unify the main radical parties. In October, 1978, Ismail dissolved the UPONF and created a new party, the Yemeni Socialist party, his aim being to further revolutionary transformation at home and draw even closer to the Soviet bloc abroad. A year later, on October 25, 1979, during a trip to Moscow, he signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The treaty signified the leaders' desire "to strengthen the unbreakable friendship between the two countries and steadily develop political relations and . . . cooperation."

A bloodless coup in April, 1980, toppled Fatah Ismail, but Soviet-PDRY relations remained close.

The new Yemeni leader of the party and government, Ali Nasir Mohammad, traveled to the Soviet Union and was warmly received the following month. There are even indications that Moscow prefers to deal with him, because he is less doctrinaire and less threatening to his neighbors.

Moscow quickly adapted to the new situation, intent on preserving the considerable benefits that it has acquired in the PDRY in recent years. First, the PDRY is a strategic point on any geopolitical map. It commands access to the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and its port of Aden is the best in that part of the world. Moscow has been granted access to Aden and the use of nearby air bases. The massive Soviet airlift of arms to Ethiopia in 1977-1978 was immeasurably facilitated because of free Soviet access to the PDRY's bases. In addition, Moscow has been permitted major repair, storage and communications facilities.

Second, the Soviet military use the airfields to fly missions over the Indian Ocean-Red Sea basin, gathering intelligence on United States naval activities. Aerial reconnaissance is a valuable complement to the data collected as a result of spying from space satellites.

Third, the Soviet presence on the Arabian Peninsula is a tangible reminder to Saudi Arabia of Moscow's disruptive, or mediatory, potential. For example, in February-March, 1979, during the outbreak of fighting between the two Yemens, the Soviet Union supplied arms to both sides, more with a view toward safeguarding its relationship with each than with helping one side defeat the other. Moscow hopes that Riyadh's concern over the Yemeni threat may eventually induce the Saudis to normalize relations with the U.S.S.R.

Finally, Soviet aid to the PDRY has helped keep a revolutionary, anti-American regime in power and has demonstrated Moscow's support for "progressive" regimes. It is enough for Moscow that the PDRY pursues policies that are generally antithetical to the interests of the United States.

LIBYA

The Soviet-Libyan relationship developed gradually. After Colonel Muammar Qadafi seized power on September 1, 1969, Libya began purchasing weap-

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Alvin Z. Rubinstein, one of *Current History's* contributing editors, is author of a number of books on Soviet affairs, including *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) and *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global* (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1981). He is a senior fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania.

"In a time when colonialism has all but disappeared from the face of the earth, the Soviet Union gives every indication that it will continue to pursue anachronistic imperial policies."

Soviet Policies in East Europe

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

Director, International Studies Program, Hoover Institution

THE last colonial empire in the world today, the Soviet Union is faced with the mounting problems of its dependencies in East Europe. A façade of political unity exists; alliance war games take place on schedule; new five-year economic plans (1981-1985) have been adopted. And yet the winds of change are evident. In order to discourage liberal developments, Soviet leaders may order their armed forces to occupy Poland; Soviet military intervention once in every decade has been the pattern since World War II: Hungary (November, 1956), Czechoslovakia (August, 1968) and Afghanistan (December, 1979).

All bloc leaders make their obeisance to Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev during their annual pilgrimages to Oradea in the Crimea every summer. These are held on a bilateral basis, always in a "fraternal and cordial atmosphere"; and they usually result in a "complete unity of views on all questions under discussion." Only "mutual understanding," however, could be achieved at meetings with delegations from Romania and Poland.¹

In January, 1980, Romania abstained from the United Nations General Assembly vote that overwhelmingly called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; all other bloc countries went on record against this resolution. After three days in Bucharest, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko returned to Moscow with an agreement that Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan had been necessary because of "imperialist" machinations there. Probably as a quid pro quo, Romania received almost 1.5 million tons of Soviet petroleum during calendar year 1980.

The case of Poland is much more complicated because of the independent Solidarity trade union for

*On the sovereignty and international duties of Socialist countries, enunciated in September, 1968. For the text see *Current History*, April, 1969, pp. 237ff.

¹Moscow radio, July 24 through August 11, 1980, broadcast communiqés with such phraseology. Over the past five years, 37 such meetings have taken place in the Crimea, according to *Pravda* (Moscow), March 20, 1981.

²*Pravda*, April 2, 1981. See also *ibid.*, May 16, 1981.

On June 5th, the Polish leaders received a sharply worded message from Moscow which urged brakes on reforms in Poland. *The Economist* (London), June 13, 1981, p. 45.

³*The New York Times*, April 6, 1981.

industrial workers (a similar organization has been recognized for private entrepreneur farmers). Polish developments are unique; they have no counterpart in any other Communist-ruled state, and they undermine the basis of regime authority, which must consider Solidarity as a constraint upon government freedom of action, especially in the economic sphere.

That constraint is the basic reason for Soviet uneasiness and for the propaganda barrage from other East European capitals that appears to be orchestrated by Moscow. Apparently worried by reports of Soviet troop concentrations along its borders, Polish Communist leader Stanislaw Kania asserted on March 14, 1981, that Poland "is and will be an ally of the Soviet Union." Only two weeks later, the official party organ in the Soviet Union launched a strong attack on "anti-socialist" elements that had organized a meeting at Warsaw University and had allegedly criticized the Marxist system. And according to Moscow, the local Polish Communist party organization made no attempt to refute this criticism.² It is not known exactly what Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko discussed during his July 2-4, 1981, visit in Poland. The communiqué made no direct reference to liberalization, although it did include a restatement of the Brezhnev Doctrine.*

Because of its geographic location as the assembly area for the second echelon of Warsaw Pact troops facing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, western Poland is of strategic importance to the Soviet Union. In case of war, Soviet naval infantry would move out from the Baltic coast for assaults against the Danish islands and the West German port city of Kiel. According to Western military analysts,³ Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov has reportedly tried to convince Brezhnev to occupy Poland, because of its strategic position.

In the event of a Soviet takeover, Soviet occupation authorities would be faced with a general strike. Indigenous Polish troops and/or police cannot be relied on to maintain foreign-imposed martial law over a hostile population of 36 million. The national character of the Poles is anything but passive, and Soviet armed forces would make easy targets for urban guerrillas in the underground tradition of World War II.

Table 1: Warsaw Pact Forces

Country	Manpower				Equipment			Expenditures	
	Army	Air	Navy	Tanks	Combat air- craft	Ships (incl. subs)	Per capita (dollars)	Per- cent of GNP	
Bulgaria	105,000	34,000	10,000	1,800	210	69	66	2.5	
Czechoslovakia	140,000	55,000	—	3,600	471	—	153	3.8	
East Germany	108,000	38,000	16,000	3,200	347	142	253	5.8	
Hungary	72,000	21,000	—	1,310	170	—	76	2.4	
Poland	210,000	85,000	22,500	3,500	700	114	95	3.0	
Romania	140,000	34,000	10,500	1,700	328	114	58	1.7	
U.S.S.R.	1,825,000	475,000	433,000	50,000	4,350	1,280	526	13.0	
Totals:	2,600,000	742,000	492,000	65,110	6,576	1,719	176*	4.6*	

*Note: averages.

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1980-1981* (London: IISS, September, 1980), pp. 9-17.

The assassination of Soviet and puppet officials, attacks upon military patrols, disruption of railroad traffic (not to mention the petroleum and natural gas pipelines to and from East Germany), the sabotage of Polish defense plants, and the flooding of coal mines in Silesia are a few examples of what Moscow can anticipate. Rather than risk this kind of nightmare, Kremlin decision-makers have applied psychological measures to contain the free trade union movement in Poland.⁴ During early July, 1981, Western intelligence indicates that the readiness of Soviet troops along Polish borders had slipped to where three days would be needed to prepare an invasion, compared with a few hours during the previous "high alert."

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (WTO)

The Warsaw Pact military alliance, which has included all East European client states since its inception in May, 1955 (except Yugoslavia), is a symbol of the Soviet readiness to intervene if local Communist control appears in jeopardy. The Soviet Union predominates: it supplies two-thirds of the Warsaw Pact's conventional as well as all of its nuclear capabilities. In addition, most of the advanced weapons systems and equipment are supplied by Moscow,⁵ and all commanding officers, chiefs of staff, and pact mission delegates to member-country de-

⁴"Soyuz-81" maneuvers on Polish territory lasted 22 days, ending April 7, 1981, the longest in Warsaw Pact history. In a continuing war of nerves, Soviet reservists were called up in Transcarpathia bordering on Poland and told to be ready to "defend the socialist community." *Examiner & Chronicle* (San Francisco), July 5, 1981.

⁵*Le Monde dimanche* (Paris), May 4, 1980.

⁶See chapter 9 in Richard F. Staar, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Press, 1977), 3rd rev. ed., pp. 213-238.

⁷A. Ross Johnson et al., *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, December 1980), R-2417/1-AF/FF, pp. 171-177.

⁸V.I. Menzhinskij (chief ed.), *Mezhdunarodnie organizatsii sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenia, 1980), p. 57.

fense ministries have always been Soviet officers.

The Soviet Union's distrust of its allies also manifests itself in the weakness of the WTO's organizational integration. In peace time, the unified command only controls combat readiness and participation in joint maneuvers. During the past two decades, these annual war games have taken place on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis. Since 1964, however, Romania has not allowed its territory to be used for troop maneuvers and sends only staff officers to observe WTO exercises.

The Warsaw Treaty itself was signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, but East German armed forces were not made a part of WTO until the following January. Albania, de facto, left the organization in 1961 but announced its withdrawal only after the invasion of Czechoslovakia seven years later.⁶ The Chinese stopped sending observers in 1962. The northern tier (Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland) has received better equipment than other parts of East Europe. All three of these countries spend considerably more per capita on defense than their neighbors. (See Table 1.)

A recent study concludes that the institutional histories of the Czechoslovak, East German and Polish armed forces are so different that they represent a potential constraint on the Soviet ability to use them against NATO.⁷ Nor are their national interests the same. Coalition warfare against NATO would be difficult, and only a surprise Warsaw Pact offensive might create the necessary momentum to pull the northern-tier armed forces along. Apparently, they are not reliable for domestic repression.

COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The Soviet Union maintains substantial day-to-day leverage throughout the bloc only from an economic perspective. CMEA was established in January, 1949, as a response to the Marshall plan for West Europe.⁸ East Germany joined the following year; Albania unilaterally withdrew in 1961. Other members include Mongolia (1962), Yugoslavia (associate status,

1965), Cuba (1972), and Vietnam (1978).

Almost 70 percent of all East European iron ore requirements, 93 percent of its coal, and 68 percent of its petroleum are supplied within CMEA. Admittedly there are problems: inadequate efficiency, a low degree of assimilation for new equipment, rising prices for raw materials and energy from outside the bloc, shortages of manpower, bad weather conditions.

Soviet spokesman Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Moscow Institute on the Economy of the World Socialist System, has warned East European CMEA members that by 1990 they will be forced to import half their energy needs from outside the bloc. Some of the difference may be made up from electricity, generated by nuclear power plants now under construction, and by increased natural gas deliveries from the Soviet Union.

At its 33d council session (June 26-28, 1979), all of the East European CMEA members, including Yugoslavia, agreed to deliver equipment for the construction of nuclear power stations in the U.S.S.R. The first of these is planned for completion in 1984 and should have a 4,000 MW capacity. Each major contributor (U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) will receive electricity through the year 2003, in proportion to their investment. A second plant, with the same capacity, is to be built by 1990; it is still not clear which countries will contribute to it. Two additional plants are scheduled for construction in the Soviet Union.⁹ In addition to petroleum, the U.S.S.R. is already delivering natural gas from Orenburg to East Europe via a 2,677-kilometer pipeline, already at its planned annual capacity and delivering 15.5 billion cubic meters to bloc countries.¹⁰

Apart from the incipient problems of securing future energy requirements, most countries in the bloc have suffered from a recent economic downturn. Western banks and government export credit institutions have extended more than \$90 billion in loans to CMEA members for the purchase of plants and equipment, and to their affiliated banks. (See Table 2.) In addition, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia have received most favored nation (MFN) status from the United States, which has continued to trade with bloc countries despite the American semi-embargo

⁹*Sotsialisticheskaiia industriia* (Moscow), June 7, 1980; *Ekonomicheskaiia gazeta* (Moscow), August 18, 1980; and *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), June 7-8, 1980.

¹⁰*Pravda*, January 17, 1981; *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), May 5, 1981.

¹¹*Pravda*, February 24, 1981.

¹²*Wall Street Journal*, March 21, 1981. Bulgaria, Romania and the U.S.S.R. also recorded agricultural shortfalls during calendar year 1980.

The United States has pledged \$70 million in surplus butter and dried milk, the French 400,000 tons of wheat, and other West European governments \$800 million in additional credits to Poland. *The New York Times*, April 3, 1981.

**Table 2: East European Debt to the West
(billions of dollars)**

Country/Bank	Amount
Bulgaria	3.0
Czechoslovakia	3.3
East Germany	9.7
Hungary	7.1
Poland	27.0
Romania	8.6
U.S.S.R.	11.5
Yugoslavia	18.0
CMEA Banks*	5.0
Total:	93.2

*Note: International Bank for Economic Cooperation; International Investment Bank.

Sources: Bankers Trust, cited by *The New York Times*, May 21, 1981; *ibid.*, June 13, 1981.

**Table 3: U.S. Trade with Soviet Bloc
(millions of dollars)***

Country	Imports from		Exports to	
	1979	1980	1979	1980
Albania	7.5	9.3	7.6	6.8
Bulgaria	26.1	19.7	44.9	117.3
Czechoslovakia	36.4	49.7	146.7	142.1
East Germany	27.1	33.4	192.5	357.7
Hungary	80.1	81.4	53.6	60.9
Poland	320.7	309.9	502.3	487.9
Romania	256.8	256.8	367.4	575.3
U.S.S.R.	489.5	316.0	2,476.8	824.1
Totals:	1,244.2	1,076.2	3,791.8	2,572.1
Total U.S. imports:	149,261.1	180,293.1		

*Note: January through September of each year.

Sources: U.S. Department of State, *Trade of NATO and Communist Countries* (Washington, D.C.: 1981), Special Report no. 7, p. 7.

against the Soviet Union. (See Table 3). Many of these transactions may serve as conduits for the high technology items needed by the U.S.S.R.

Hungary's economic reforms were even mentioned positively by Brezhnev, who praised "how skillfully the work of agricultural cooperatives and enterprises . . . has been organized."¹¹ He may have been referring to the fact that some private entrepreneur farmers are offered government loans to stimulate production. In addition, an independent agency called Interinvest concentrates all the investment funds of 38 Hungarian foreign trade companies in heavy, light and food industries that export their products. Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which is a modified market system with limited private enterprise, may be emulated by other bloc countries.

The total production of goods during the calendar year 1980 increased by only 1.1 percent for all East Europe. Hungary (despite the NEM reform mentioned above) and Poland registered declines; Poland's farm output dropped for a second consecutive year.¹² The Polish situation has become so desperate that the U.S.S.R. pledged to deliver \$1.3-billion worth

of goods during 1981, in addition to 1980 deliveries: wheat (500,000 tons); fish and fish products (10,000 tons); onions (10,000 tons); tomato paste (320 tons); plus unspecified quantities of cotton, cellulose and synthetic rubber.¹³ No move has been made by the Soviet Union, on the other hand, to help Poland reduce its foreign currency debt of more than \$27 billion. According to a Reuter's dispatch from Sofia, the July 2-4, 1981, CMEA meeting did not decide to provide Warsaw with collective aid.

THE PARTY CONGRESSES

Several of the East European ruling movements scheduled congresses, convened at five-year intervals, to coincide with the congress of their Soviet counterpart, which held its 26th such meeting from February 23 through March 3, 1981, at Moscow. The exceptions included Yugoslavia (1978), Romania (1979), and Hungary (1980) which have held their congresses during the past three years. An extraordinary congress met during July 14-20, 1981, in Warsaw. A regular one has been scheduled to open November 1, 1981, in Tirana and another in the same category during mid-1982 in Belgrade.

The session in Moscow stressed continuity and conservatism. Neither economic reforms nor any major changes in resource allocations surfaced. On the international front, however, Brezhnev warned that all Communists would help to "defend the socialist gains of the peoples," a clear warning to all regimes in East Europe.¹⁴

The party congress in Bulgaria, held from March 31 through April 4, 1981, heard General Secretary Todor Zhivkov express hope that the Polish comrades would lead their country out of its crisis. As in the Soviet case, no major changes or pronouncements were made. In contrast with the 1976 congress, attended by party leaders from almost all other Warsaw Pact states, this time only Politburo member V.V. Shcherbitskii represented Moscow and officials at similar levels came from other East European parties.

Brezhnev himself, however, headed the Soviet delegation to the party meeting in Czechoslovakia during April 6-10, 1981. His presence indicated support for Gustav Husak, who had replaced reformist Alexander Dubcek as Czech party leader after the Soviet occupation. The "fraternal aid," mentioned by Brezhnev and Husak in their speeches, was by inference extended to developments in Poland. Thus Brezhnev restated his doctrine of limited sovereignty: whatever happens in

¹³ Moscow radio, January 8, 1981; *Trybuna ludu*, April 15, 1981. This last paper claimed on July 4, 1981, that the U.S.S.R. had given Poland the equivalent of \$4.2 billion during 1980.

¹⁴"Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Current Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy," *New Times* (Moscow), no. 9 (February, 1981).

¹⁵*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), April 12, 1981.

East Europe is of concern to all Warsaw Pact members.

A day after the congress ended at Prague, the East Berlin Congress opened. In his report on behalf of the Central Committee, party and government leader Erich Honecker pledged "fraternal solidarity with the Polish Communists" against "all machinations by counterrevolutionary forces. . . ."¹⁵ (Honecker reportedly had spoken against a military occupation of Poland at the December, 1980, meeting of East European party chiefs in Moscow. His attitude supposedly coincided with that of Brezhnev's at the time.

In any event the Polish United Workers' party did hold its week-long extraordinary congress during mid-July, 1981; First Secretary Kania received 1,311 of the 1,950 ballots cast and was reelected. The only other candidate had 568 votes, a total of 60 delegates registered against both, and 11 abstained. Politburo member V.V. Grishin headed the Soviet delegation. The only other foreign delegates came from ruling Communist parties.

Stanislaw Kania at 54 is the youngest leader in East Europe, having succeeded to the first secretaryship in September, 1980, during the wave of strikes. In his acceptance speech at the congress, he stated that the party must regain its credibility, so "nobody in the world will doubt that Poland is and will continue to be an infallible link in the socialist community." However, Kania also promised to lead in a "march along the straight road of socialist renewal," a pledge that may not have been welcome in Moscow.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLOC STATES

While it would be impossible (without Soviet permission) for the East Germans, Czechs or Bulgarians to move toward a mixed socialist-capitalist market economy, this apparently is the direction toward which Hungary has been moving. The Hungarian five-year plan, 1981-1985, envisages a doubling of investment funds for the modernization of firms with export markets and limited convertibility of the forint by the end of that period. The Hungarians, of course, have been pursuing such objectives ever since 1968 under the New Economic Mechanism, albeit cautiously in order not to provoke the U.S.S.R.

Of all the Warsaw Pact members, the Romanians

(Continued on page 342)

One of *Current History*'s contributing editors, **Richard F. Staar** is the author of *Poland, 1944-1962: Sovietization of a Captive People* (Baton Rouge, La.: LSU Press, 1962; reprinted in Westport, Ct., by Greenwood Press, 1975), and has edited the last 13 volumes of *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Press). He is author of *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Stanford: Hoover Press), the 4th revised edition of which will appear in January, 1982.

In his analysis of the Soviet position after the events in Iran and Afghanistan, this author says that ". . . although Moscow initially welcomed the fall of the Shah, it has long since become evident that this Western loss did not result in any major Soviet gain." And in regard to Afghanistan, he says that "Contrary to a widely held Western view, the Soviet Union's occupation of its poor and economically underdeveloped southern neighbor did not represent a victory for Moscow's 'global expansionists.' "

Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan

BY O. M. SMOLANSKY

Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University

THOSE analysts who view the world through the prism of the East-West conflict and who apply the "zero-sum" theory to international relations have generally regarded the overthrow of Iran's Mohammed Riza Shah Pahlevi and the ensuing instability in the Persian Gulf as major blows to the United States and its allies and as corresponding gains for the Soviet Union.

In the 1970's, Iran emerged as the most influential military and political power in the Persian Gulf. Although the Shah maintained extensive economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and had actually purchased some Soviet arms, he made no secret of his mistrust of Moscow's ultimate intentions and went so far as to accuse the Kremlin of harboring ambitions to communize Iran and, ultimately, to dominate the entire Gulf. To counter this perceived threat to Iran's security, the Shah established a close working relationship with the United States, normalized relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and sent Iranian forces to help combat the Soviet-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.

Nonetheless, the problems with a simplistic view of the Shah's downfall as a chapter in Soviet-American rivalry are obvious. On the one hand, there is no reason to doubt Moscow's initial delight at the collapse of the Shah's regime, widely regarded as the pillar of the United States position in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, it is clear that the Iranian revolution caught the Kremlin by surprise. This is evident from the cautious line followed by the Soviet media in 1978: the Shah was not subjected to public abuse until he had left the country in January, 1979. Only then did Moscow come out openly in favor of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in spite of his strong and well-known anti-Communist and anti-Soviet views.

Moreover, in the thinly disguised hope that the pronounced anti-United States attitude of Iran's new rulers not only precluded resumption of close relations with Washington but might also facilitate a rapprochement between Teheran and Moscow, the Kremlin promptly recognized the provisional govern-

ment of Mehdi Bazargan. On March 3, 1979, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev welcomed the "victory of the revolution" and expressed hope that "relations of good neighborliness" would "develop fruitfully." Instead, the revolutionary regime soon let it be known that Iran had no intention of befriending the Soviet Union. On the contrary, in November, Teheran unilaterally abrogated Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty with the U.S.S.R. which, respectively, prohibited the presence in Iran of foreign forces constituting a threat to the U.S.S.R.'s security and permitted the entry of Soviet troops into Iran should such a threat emerge. The precedent for unilateral abrogation of these two articles was set by the Shah in 1959; but in 1959, as in 1979, the Kremlin declared that as far as the U.S.S.R. was concerned the 1921 treaty remained in effect in its entirety.

Moscow-Teheran relations deteriorated further as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. Iran condemned the move as a manifestation of the "colonialism of the East," demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, and initiated a program of modest support for the anti-Communist insurgents. In early 1980, representatives of the Afghan resistance groups joined the Iranian delegation attending the Islamic conference in Pakistan. Repeated Soviet protests were of no avail and might, in fact, have been counterproductive. Later in the year, Iran's Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh accused the U.S.S.R. of subversive activities and ordered Moscow to reduce the size of its Teheran embassy and to close one of its two provincial consulates.

In August, 1980, Ghotbzadeh again attacked Soviet policy toward Iran and Afghanistan, prompting Brezhnev, on August 29, to blast the Islamic Republic for ignoring the principle of self-determination in its treatment of the Afghani revolution. In December, 1980, a crowd of Afghans residing in Teheran protested the anniversary of the Soviet invasion by staging an attack on the Soviet embassy. In a note on December 28, the Kremlin accused the Iranian authorities of negligence in protecting Soviet property.

As a result of these developments, and in spite of the moral support it extended to Iran in connection with the hostage crisis; the U.S.S.R. found it impossible to capitalize fully on Teheran's open hostility toward the United States. Soviet problems were exacerbated by the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war in September, 1980, and by the subsequent release, in January, 1981, of the United States hostages. The latter event in particular removed a serious threat of harsh countermeasures by the newly elected administration of United States President Ronald Reagan and re-established a semblance of sanity in Washington-Teheran relations.

In short, although Moscow initially welcomed the fall of the Shah, it has long since become evident that this Western loss did not result in any major Soviet gain. On the contrary, the Iranian revolution and its aftermath presented the Kremlin with problems of its own. Thus, the continuing political instability in Teheran, the growth of centrifugal forces in Iran's outlying provinces (among them Kurdistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchistan), the upsurge of religious fundamentalism, and other problems have driven home the point that the national interests of the U.S.S.R., too, were negatively affected by the Iranian upheavals.

Specifically, in the early stages of the revolution and, subsequently, for the duration of the hostage crisis, Moscow was clearly apprehensive that Washington might attempt, through subversion or force, to restore in Iran a regime amenable to United States wishes. That United States intervention was not acceptable to the Kremlin was evident from Brezhnev's November 19, 1978, warning that "military intervention in the affairs of Iran—a state which has a common frontier with the Soviet Union—would be regarded by the U.S.S.R. as a matter affecting its security interests." Clearly implied was the threat that any United States military move against Iran would be followed by Soviet intervention.

In addition to superpower rivalry, the Kremlin was uneasy about the prospect of a highly destabilized situation south of its 2,500-km-long border with Iran. The advent to power of the fundamentalist religious and nationalist elements resentful of both "satanic" superpowers rendered an accommodation between Moscow and Teheran unlikely. Moreover, it was reasonable to assume that the Islamic resurgence in Iran (and, for that matter, in Afghanistan), as well as the drive for self-assertion among Iran's national minorities, might exert a "negative" influence among the Muslim inhabitants of the Soviet Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics who, by the year 2000, are expected to account for some 30 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s total population.

Some of these apprehensions appeared justified when Iran's new clerical leaders began calling for more religious freedom for Soviet Muslims. The

Kremlin responded by jamming the broadcasts of Radio Teheran. Concurrently, Iran's minorities, and especially the Kurds, began pressing Iran for more autonomy and, according to some sources, were demanding nothing less than total independence. The Kurdish demands presented Moscow with a dilemma: it could support them and face the danger of driving a reluctant Teheran back into the hands of the United States or it could deny them Soviet backing and be accused of insensitivity to the national aspirations of persecuted minorities. Since both options were judged counterproductive, the Kremlin has confined itself to urging moderation on all concerned. Not surprisingly, this stand has pleased neither side, further complicating the Soviet position in Iran.

Another problem for the U.S.S.R. has been the stand taken by the pro-Kremlin Tudeh party. Banned by the Shah in 1949 and driven underground, it remained largely ineffective and did not play a major role in the revolution. Subsequently, the Tudeh gained some prominence when it broke with other left-wing forces and sided with the Islamic Republican party in the latter's attempt to oust President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and break the power of his supporters, especially the Mujahideen-i-Khalq ("The People's Crusaders"), an organization whose ideology represents a curious blend of Marxism, populism and Islam. As a result, the Tudeh, whose current stand reflects both the party's weakness and its determination not to provoke the wrath of Iran's powerful clerics, has been a source of some ideological embarrassment to Moscow—it is seen as supporting the very forces that make no secret of their deep aversion to atheism and communism as well as to the U.S.S.R., which personifies both these doctrines.

As time passed, it also became obvious to the Kremlin that the Iranian revolution had disrupted the Soviet Union's highly beneficial and profitable economic relations with Teheran. Established in the 1960's and 1970's, these ties had provided for Soviet assistance in the construction of steel and petrochemical industries as well as in mineral prospecting and agriculture and in the development of a communications network, in exchange for Iranian natural gas and oil. This disruption has assumed particular significance in view of the possibility that, by the late 1980's and beyond, continued Soviet economic growth is likely to be predicated on Moscow's ability to import foreign petroleum and gas.

Among Soviet-Iranian projects was the construction in Iran of the first natural gas pipeline to the Soviet border (IGAT-1, completed in 1970) and the conclusion, in 1975, of a multilateral gas agreement between the U.S.S.R., France, West Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Iran. This accord provided for the construction of a second pipeline (IGAT-2) at a cost of \$3 billion. The pumping of Iranian natural

gas to Central and West Europe was scheduled to begin by 1981. In 1977, Iran entered an agreement to supply the U.S.S.R. with one million tons of crude oil a year in exchange for Soviet assistance in building several industrial projects.

All these important undertakings were negatively affected by the revolution. The Joint Soviet-Iranian Economic Commission, set up in 1976, was completely inactive until an uneventful June, 1980, meeting in Moscow, and nothing has been heard about it since. A major stumbling block in normalizing economic relations was the dispute over the price of gas. In early 1980, Teheran halted all shipments via IGAT-1 in retaliation for the Kremlin's refusal to accede to a fivefold increase in the price of gas negotiated by the Shah's government. (The Iranian demand was designed to bring the price of gas into harmony with the prevailing world market rate of \$3.80 per 1,000 cubic feet.) Until this major dispute is resolved, the resumption of large-scale economic cooperation between the two countries is highly unlikely. The September, 1980, signing of a transit agreement that facilitated the flow of Iranian trade through Soviet territory was a move designed to neutralize some of the effects of a possible United States blockade of Iranian ports at the height of the hostage crisis. It did not, however, lead to a marked increase in trade or a lessening of Moscow-Teheran tensions.

THE IRANIAN-IRAQI DISPUTE

As a result of its displeasure with Iraq and its strained relations with Iran, the U.S.S.R. adopted an "evenhanded" approach to the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. While Soviet media coverage judiciously "balanced" the Iraqi and Iranian reports, editorial comment, not surprisingly, blamed the United States for fomenting the strife in order to facilitate United States intervention in the Persian Gulf and called on the belligerents to resolve their differences by peaceful means.

In addition to highlighting the depths to which Soviet-Iraqi and Soviet-Iranian relations have sunk in the early 1980's, the Iraqi-Iranian war affected the Kremlin in other ways. On the positive side, it diverted world attention from the U.S.S.R.'s own activities in Afghanistan. The Islamic countries in particular invested much time and energy in the Gulf conflict. On the negative side, at least in the short run, the war presented Moscow with a "no-win" situation. An Iraqi victory would not only strengthen Baghdad's independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union but might also pave the way for a partial reconciliation between Iran and the United States—a turn of events that is clearly not in the Kremlin's interest. Conversely, Iraq's defeat would solidify an anti-Soviet regime in Teheran without, in any way, improving Moscow's low standing in the eyes of the current Baathi leaders. In exposing the general weakness of the Soviet posi-

tion in the Persian Gulf, the war also demonstrated that the U.S.S.R.'s freedom of maneuver is severely circumscribed by its unwillingness to risk a confrontation with Washington in a region which both the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations have declared to be of vital interest to the United States. On balance, therefore, the outbreak of hostilities between two of the Soviet Union's southern neighbors may well have been an unwelcome development for Moscow.

The lack of attractive options explains the general ineffectiveness of the Kremlin's stance on the Iranian-Iraqi war. Insistence on neutrality and calls for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, combined with a limited delivery of arms to Baghdad and the suspected channeling of some military support to Teheran (via Syria and Libya), have done little to enhance the Soviet position with either combatant. On the contrary, Moscow's words and actions have netted the U.S.S.R. the thinly disguised hostility of Iraq and have not produced any measurable gains in Iran.

Brezhnev's much-heralded December, 1980, proposal for the establishment of a "zone of peace" in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean—a rehash of previous Soviet positions—should be seen as an open admission of the Kremlin's own awareness of its inability either to change the situation in the Gulf significantly or to compete effectively with the United States in a region where no one likes or trusts "the great northern power."

AFGHANISTAN

Contrary to a widely held Western view, the Soviet Union's occupation of its poor and economically underdeveloped southern neighbor did not represent a victory for Moscow's "global expansionists." It was, instead, an open admission of the failure of Soviet foreign policy or, more specifically, of Soviet inability to control events in Kabul by means other than military intervention.

Western analysts have differed in their assessment of Soviet complicity in the original Marxist takeover of April, 1978. In retrospect, the events preceding the revolution (i.e., King Muhammad Daud's decision to crush the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan, or PDPA) as well as the spontaneity of the uprising itself appear to support the position of those who argued that the 1978 upheaval was a local affair executed without Soviet involvement or guidance. On the other hand, there is no argument about Moscow's prompt commitment to the preservation of Afghanistan's Marxist regime. Military aid was supplemented by economic assistance and political guidance to ensure the success of what was publicly greeted as another "national liberation revolution."

Almost from the very start, however, the U.S.S.R. began encountering problems in Kabul. For one

thing, the PDPA's two rival factions—the Khalq (People), led by Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and the Parcham, headed by Babrak Karmal—were soon at odds and spent much time jockeying for positions of power. The initial success in this confrontation belonged to the Khalq. With the Parcham "deviationists" in retreat and its leaders in exile in East Europe, the victorious faction set out to reshape Afghan society in accordance with Marxist-Leninist precepts.

This ambitious program, ranging from land nationalization and redistribution to far-reaching social reforms, was imposed without regard for traditional religious and cultural values and thus provoked widespread resentment. Even a strong central government, united in purpose and action, would have been hard-pressed to cope with the deteriorating situation. As it happened, the Khalq did not qualify under either count. By late summer-early fall, 1979, serious strains between Taraki and Amin led to a palace coup and Taraki's assassination only a few days after his return from Moscow, where the picture of Brezhnev and Taraki warmly embracing had been prominently displayed on the front page of *Pravda*.

Taraki's violent death caused consternation in the Kremlin. Soviet anxiety was heightened by an awareness that Taraki's successor, Hafizullah Amin, insisted on conducting Afghanistan's foreign and domestic policies without regard for Soviet wishes. For example, Amin opposed Moscow's support of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini. Domestically, brushing aside Soviet calls for moderation, Amin intensified the implementation of unpopular socioeconomic reforms and, in so doing, helped to strengthen the resistance to Kabul's Communist authorities. In addition, Amin undertook to purge the party, the government, and the armed forces not only of Karmal's followers but also of Taraki's. Soviet objections prompted Amin to accuse the U.S.S.R. of interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The growing crisis came to a head in the fall of 1979. In October, Amin publicly demanded the recall of the Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan—a request that Moscow could not but honor—and, in November, he reportedly denied the U.S.S.R. the use of the airbase at Shinand, near the Iranian border.

Amin's challenge confronted Moscow with a most

¹See Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (winter, 1980-81), pp. 163-187.

²On October 12, 1980, for example, Radio Kabul announced that the Soviet Union had obligated itself to provide Afghanistan with commodities valued at about \$15 million a year as a grant-in-aid for the period between 1980 and 1984. In addition, the sum of \$570 million has been made available to finance various development projects. Another \$300 million has been earmarked for the Aïnak copper project.

unpleasant choice.¹ The U.S.S.R. could abandon Afghanistan to its own devices and could thus replay in Central Asia the drama that shook the Communist world in 1945 with Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito's expulsion from the Soviet orbit, or it could, by means of military intervention, force this new Communist maverick into submission. Considering the probable repercussions of Moscow's inaction (among them the likely growth of United States influence in Afghanistan), the Kremlin, not surprisingly, chose the second alternative. On December 25, 1979, the Soviet military contingent in Kabul, augmented by newly arrived reinforcements, moved against the presidential palace. Amin was arrested and, shortly afterward, was executed. Babrak Karmal returned from Moscow to become Afghanistan's new President and Secretary-General of what remained of the PDPA. In an attempt to effect national reconciliation, the Parcham abandoned many of Amin's unpopular reforms and displayed public respect for Afghanistan's religious and cultural traditions. Karmal's efforts have been largely unsuccessful, however. Resentment against Soviet intervention spread throughout the country and, by 1981, some 85,000 Soviet troops were required to maintain a highly unpopular, pro-Moscow regime in power.

In the process, the U.S.S.R. suffered manpower losses and assumed responsibility for Afghanistan's economy², and was subjected to other pressures as well. There were, for one thing, the various material sanctions imposed by some Western powers, led by the United States. Most of them have been overcome in one way or another without inflicting any enduring damage to the Soviet economy. The Olympic boycott hurt, but was of no long-lasting consequence. Far more important to the Kremlin was the enormous loss of prestige and good will, built over 25 years of extended military, political, economic and cultural relations in the developing world.

It is true that the condemnation of the Soviet invasion was not universal, but it came as close to being universal as is possible in a world of conflicting international loyalties. Resounding denunciations of the "unselfish friend of the developing countries"—a title the Soviets had conferred upon themselves since Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's "offensive" of the mid-1950's—were heard in all the truly international forums (the United Nations General Assembly, the Nonaligned Conference, the Islamic Conferences, and

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O. M. Smolansky is the author of *The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Khrushchev* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974) and has written extensively on Soviet foreign policy and the international relations of the Middle East.

"The Castro government's recognition of the Soviet Union as the only, unerring arbiter of world affairs led Cuba to become Moscow's instrument in the international arena," notes this specialist, who concludes that "Whatever the value of Cuba to the Soviet Union as an instrument or partner in its global strategy, the Castro government has been able to extract a heavy price for its 'international solidarity.'"

The Soviet-Cuban Connection

BY GEORGE VOLSKY

Research Associate, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami

WHEN the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba on January 1, 1959, the country had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or with any other Communist bloc nation. Conversely, the Kremlin, where geopolitical considerations have always been an important element in the formulation of foreign policy, was not particularly interested in the small tropical island on the doorstep of the United States. From Moscow's vantage point, the 33-year-old Castro looked politically suspicious. In contrast to seasoned Soviet rulers, he had neither administrative experience nor ideological consistency. His main slogan, "No bread without liberty; no liberty without bread," must have sounded like social-democratic heresy to Communist ears.

At that time, Moscow had its own faithful ally in Cuba, the Cuban Communist party, the Popular Socialist party (Partido Socialista Popular, PSP), and PSP leaders, who did not distinguish themselves in Castro's guerrilla struggle against the dictatorship of General Fulgencio Batista, had never trusted the youthful revolutionary. Cuban Communist publications had described the Jesuit-educated Castro as a "putschist" and an "adventurer."

Obviously, Castro was not one of the Kremlin's docile Latin American followers. But perhaps more important than Castro's ideological fealty was the campaign of détente being promoted in 1959 by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. It was not until November, 1959, that Moscow sent its first semiofficial observer to Havana, Alexandre Alexeyev, who at the time described himself as a correspondent of Tass, the Soviet news agency.

Alexeyev was far more than a simple Tass correspondent. He promptly arranged for a visit to Cuba by Soviet Vice Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, ostensibly to inaugurate a Soviet exhibit in Havana. In May, 1960, Soviet-Cuban relations were reestablished,¹ and the Spanish-speaking Alexeyev became an attaché

to the Soviet embassy in Havana. In June, 1962, he was named ambassador and held that post for about five years.

Mikoyan's mission to Havana marked the beginning of close political and economic bonds between the Soviet Union and Cuba. Under a commercial agreement signed on February 10, 1960, the Soviet Union undertook to purchase 425,000 tons of Cuban sugar at once and one million tons a year during the 1961-1964 period, paying 80 percent in goods and the rest in hard currency. In addition, Moscow promised to give Havana a \$100-million loan and comprehensive technical and scientific assistance.

Mikoyan's visit also opened Cuba's doors to other Soviet bloc countries, whose officials descended in droves on Havana to sign bilateral diplomatic, commercial and cultural treaties. Many members of Mikoyan's entourage remained in the Cuban capital to serve as advisers of Cuba's newly created Central Planning Board. They were the guiding force in the planning and execution of the nationalization of the Cuban economy, then still in private hands, a process that began in the middle of 1960 with the seizure of United States and British oil refineries.

Soviet consumer goods, books, magazines, exhibits and artists began arriving in Cuba. At the beginning of 1960, only two percent of Cuba's total trade was with the Communist bloc. By December, it grew to 20 percent, and by May, 1961, to 75 percent.² Soviet military aid to Cuba was apparently provided under a secret agreement signed in the fall of 1960, and in early 1961 for the first time Castro's armed forces openly displayed large quantities of Soviet weapons. Soviet influence was equally visible in Cuban political life. In May, 1961, for the first time, Castro declared that his was a "socialist revolution." A Marxist-Leninist organization called O.R.I., which combined various leftist elements of the Cuban political spectrum including the Old Guard pro-Moscow Communists, came into being, the only political group allowed to operate in Cuba.

Despite Castro's obvious willingness to become part of the "socialist group of nations," Moscow de-

¹General Batista broke Cuban relations with the Soviet Union shortly after his March 10, 1952, coup d'état.

²Revolución (Havana), May 17, 1961.

liberated about a year before admitting Cuba into the international Communist family. On April 11, 1962, the official Soviet newspaper *Pravda* finally declared editorially that Cuba was striving to reach the socialist stage of development, a statement which was tantamount to membership in the Soviet bloc.

In reality, Soviet leaders felt personally and politically uncomfortable with the young and unmanageable Cuban revolutionaries. In Havana, it soon became obvious to Castro that Soviet Ambassador Sergei Kudiratsev was more friendly with, and had confidence in, the members of the Communist guard, who by spring of 1962 had taken control of O.R.I.³ The Soviet ambassador tacitly endorsed a campaign waged by the old guard against the cult of personality, which was clearly directed against Castro. Castro quickly disposed of "sectarian" pro-Soviet elements in the O.R.I. and Kudiratsev was abruptly recalled to Moscow.

The October, 1962, missile crisis had a special place in Soviet-Cuban relations, marking the only time in the two-decade association that Moscow used Cuban territory for strategic offensive purposes. Preceding the missile confrontation with the United States (and possibly explaining it) was a period of extreme Soviet self-confidence projected publicly by Khrushchev. The Soviet Premier, who proclaimed that Communist Russia would bury America and pounded his shoe on the table at the United Nations when he said so, regarded the emergence of Communist Cuba as a further proof of a "favorable change in the international correlation of forces."

At that time, believing that the strategic value of a country 100 miles from the United States outweighed its economic liabilities, Khrushchev apparently chose to overlook the long-range cost of sustaining the Castro regime.⁴ Later, Moscow was obliged to divert huge material resources annually to prop up the failing Cuban economy, which has not yet managed to become viable. However embarrassed by the realization that under Castro the new Cuban Communist society would never become a model for third world countries, Khrushchev and his successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev, continued steady material and moral support to the Havana regime, accumulating political and financial debts.

The chronology of events that culminated with Khrushchev's decision to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba indicated that the Kremlin had decided unilaterally to build rocket emplacements in Cuba

³Kudiratsev, a top Soviet diplomat and intelligence agent, became famous in the late 1940's for heading a Soviet spy ring in Canada.

⁴The Soviet leader must have known it would be considerable, because it was already proving onerous as serious flaws became obvious in Cuba's economic life, run by inexperienced Castro officials.

⁵*Revolución*, November 2, 1962. Italics added.

and, later, to dismantle them under pressure from United States President John F. Kennedy. In July, Major Raul Castro, then and now Cuba's Defense Minister, flew to Moscow for an unpublicized 17-day visit, where he was apparently informed of the Soviet decision to install missiles in Cuba. Two days after the Defense Minister returned home, Soviet ships began unloading secret cargo at Cuban ports. The process of assembling that heavy equipment, and a special force to operate it, involved a logistical operation that must have begun months earlier.

The subsequent withdrawal of Soviet rockets from Cuba signaled the end of a strategic phase in Moscow's Cuban policy under which the island was to be a military base from which United States defenses could be threatened if not checkmated. Castro took some time to recover and had to forego his repeated claim that Soviet missile superiority had made the Communist bloc the mightiest world power. In a November 1, 1962, speech, Castro also voiced disdain for what he regarded as a Soviet surrender. "We do not give in to force," he said. "We do not renounce our right to possess the weapons which we want to acquire."⁵

The Soviet Union took pains to assuage Castro's wounded pride. Shortly after the removal of the missiles, Mikoyan returned to Havana on a diplomatic as well as an economic mission. Known for his bluntness, the Soviet Politburo member must have emphasized in talks with Castro a fact of international life: the Soviet Union could live happily without Cuba, while the Cuban Communist regime could not survive without the Soviet Union. But in April, 1963, when Castro visited the Soviet Union for the first time, he received a hero's welcome.

After his visit, Castro scrapped his plan for accelerated industrialization; announcing his acceptance of the Soviet principle of the "international division of labor," which in effect meant that the Cuban revolution had abandoned autarky, its most cherished economic goal. Since 1963, as a result of Soviet influence, Cuba's basic economic policy has been dependence on the export of a single agricultural product, sugar. To sweeten Cuba's return to sugar monoculture, the Soviet Union promised to help Cuba mechanize cane-cutting operations and to pay higher than world market prices for Cuban sugar.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A WATERSHED

Cuba's reaction to the August, 1968, Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia to end its Communist liberalization movement constituted a watershed in Cuban-Soviet relations. Before the Soviet invasion, Cuban leaders displayed a degree of political independence, occasionally advanced original ideas within the Marxist context and even, on several occasions, attempted to mediate the Soviet-Chinese rift, publicly

urging both sides to forget their differences for the sake of world Communist unity. But after a fateful August 23, 1968, speech by Fidel Castro, Cuba's allegiance to and political identification with the Soviet Union have been unwavering.⁶

At the inception of the 1968 "Prague Spring," the Cuban government had maintained an impartial attitude; the Havana newspapers printed without comment Soviet statements criticizing reformist Czechoslovak Communist leaders and Prague replies to the Moscow charges. In the absence of clear government policy, Cubans on the streets openly expressed support for the Prague government. Thus on August 23, when it was announced in Havana that Castro would address the country, many Cubans thought he would denounce the Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia and compare its plight to that of Cuba "threatened by Yankee imperialists." They were wrong. Although Castro conceded that Moscow lacked legal justification for entering Czechoslovakia, he concluded that the Soviet action was politically correct and therefore necessary.

Castro's abrupt change of mind has never been satisfactorily explained, although some observers suggested that the Soviet Ambassador in Havana threatened to cut off oil deliveries to Cuba. The fact remains that since the August 23, 1968, speech nothing but praise for the Soviet leadership has been heard from Havana. Summarizing the accomplishments of the Cuban revolution on its tenth anniversary on January 2, 1969, Castro expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union in effusive terms. In June of that year, at a Moscow conference of world Communist parties sponsored by the Kremlin, Cuba (which originally had not intended to attend) resolutely put itself on the side of the Soviet Union in its heated and divisive controversy with China. Cuba (which unlike most Communist countries had not broken diplomatic relations with Israel after the October, 1967, war) broke relations with Israel in 1973, ending its last vestige of independence from the Soviet foreign policy line.

MOSCOW'S INSTRUMENT

The Castro government's recognition of the Soviet Union as the only, unerring arbiter of world affairs led Cuba to become Moscow's instrument in the international arena. Whereas before 1968 Havana sought to formulate its own theories of revolutionary struggle, its independent analysis of foreign conflicts and solutions for its domestic problems, since 1968 everything it has done in these areas has had a Soviet imprint and possibly imprimatur.

Apparently on its own initiative, the Castro govern-

⁶See, for example, Second Congress of the Communist party of Cuba, *Draft Resolution on International Policy*, a monograph (Havana: Party Printing Press, December, 1980).

ment had been providing weapons, money, training and Cuban advisers to left-wing guerrillas in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela. In 1966, Castro had hosted the so-called Tricontinental Peoples Solidarity Conference whose aim was to spread militant revolutionary doctrine in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The Soviet Union had not welcomed Havana's original export of revolution, which was actively opposed by Soviet allies in Latin America. (In various Latin countries, Cuba actively supported extreme leftist groups that denounced the regular Communist parties as traitors.) It is not known to what extent Moscow's opposition was responsible for the failure of the Cuban effort, but in a few years, pro-Castro guerrillas in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela were defeated by government forces. Pro-Castro political groups faded from the Latin scene shortly afterward.

Even before they established relations with Havana, Kremlin leaders had studied Cuban involvement in revolutionary struggles abroad, and Moscow must have known most details of that involvement, which started practically the day that Fidel Castro came to power. From the beginning, the Castro regime accepted as political allies members and leaders of the Cuban Communist party, a well-disciplined, unwaveringly pro-Soviet organization. Cuban Communists were placed in many sensitive posts in the Castro government, the security apparatus and the armed forces. By the thousands, young Cubans were invited to the Soviet Union to be trained as technicians, intelligence agents, pilots and naval officers. Since 1962, a large contingent of Soviet soldiers has been stationed on Cuban soil, and Soviet specialists have been helping Cuban officials to run sugar mills, factories, ministries, power plants and planning offices.

Ever since 1968, the Soviet Union has been directly or indirectly supporting or at least acquiescing in Cuban foreign initiatives. For diplomatic and logistical reasons, Castro must have had Moscow's consent for his major foreign moves, especially in Africa and Asia and, lately, in Latin America. Implicit in Castro's acceptance of the Soviet principle of "international solidarity" was a high degree of coordination and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

CUBA IN AFRICA

Until the mid-1970's, Cuban activities in Africa were primarily military and were carried out on a very modest scale. Serious domestic economic problems required all the attention of the Cuban leaders. Yet Cuba sent small military missions to Sierra Leone and Equatorial Guinea, and sent technicians to Tanzania and Somalia. Cuban military personnel in Congo-Brazzaville grew to some 1,000; Cuban technical aid

to Algeria grew also. Havana was also helping the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), whose leader, Agostinho Neto, had had contacts with Cuba since the 1960's, and revolutionaries in Mozambique and other African countries. It was no coincidence that the groups supported by Havana were all pro-Moscow.

The 1974 military coup in Portugal increased Cuban participation in the fight for power in the Portuguese colonies. Early in 1975, as Portugal was preparing to abandon its colonial empire in Africa, Neto met Major Flavio Bravo, chief of logistics of the Cuban Armed Forces, in Brazzaville.

The Neto-Bravo meeting was important. According to the Cuban version, Neto requested urgent military assistance from Cuba, principally instructors to train MPLA members in the use of the modern weapons the organization was receiving from Soviet bloc countries. Moscow must have known the details of the Neto request and Havana's willingness to comply with it because Major Bravo, Cuba's original contact with the MPLA leader, was a lifelong Communist and one of Moscow's most trusted men in Cuba.

In November, 1975, the Cuban government received an urgent request from Neto for a military force to help MPLA's untrained troops defend Luanda, the capital of Angola, then threatened by a South African force advancing from the south. Cuba agreed to do so, beginning what it called "Operation Carlota."

Castro had already ordered the dispatch to Angola of three ships with weapons and other material and 480 military instructors. But on November 7, a massive airlift of regular Cuban soldiers began. Dressed as civilians, the Cubans carried in their suitcases submachine guns and munitions—a curious repetition of the procedure employed by German dictator Adolf Hitler in Austria and Czechoslovakia, when he sent German "tourists," soldiers in civilian clothes, to prepare for the conquest of those countries. While the airlifted Cuban soldiers were arriving in Luanda, Soviet ships with weapons were also reaching Angola. Between November, 1975, and April, 1977, when military operations slackened off on all fronts (followed by a Cuban and MPLA victory), Castro sent close to 25,000 soldiers to Angola, about 10 percent of the country's armed forces.

Castro insisted on many occasions that "Operation Carlota" was launched after his government's "unilateral decision," claiming the Soviet Union "never requested that a single Cuban be sent" to Angola.⁷ But the Soviet Union has a somewhat different perspective. Writing in 1981 about Soviet-American competition in the third world, Henry A. Trofimenco (head of the department for the study of United States

foreign policy in the Institute of United States and Canadian Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences) said:

The mid-1970's saw the collapse of the last major colonial empire—that of Portugal. The Soviet Union, in line with its principles and long-standing position of supporting the real anti-colonial revolutionary movement in Angola—the MPLA party led by Agostinho Neto—continued together with Cuba to help the MPLA consolidate its power in the country.⁸

Trofimenco's statement, which implies that the Soviet Union was principally responsible for the MPLA victory and that of other such groups, underscores one element often overlooked by Fidel Castro in his references to Cuban military actions abroad: Cuba provides only the human component for revolutionary struggle; everything else—weapons, munitions and other military supplies—is paid for by the Soviet Union. For two decades, Moscow has been arming Cuban armed forces without receiving one ruble from the Castro regime. Cuban soldiers, many of them black, are particularly useful to the Soviet Union in Africa, where Russians or East Germans would look very much like troops of the old colonial powers.

Several years later, Cuban troops proved their worth in another area of the African continent, the Horn of Africa. In 1972, Cuba and Somalia established diplomatic relations that became progressively closer because Somalia was a trusted friend of the Soviet Union, which then regarded Ethiopia as an adversary. Havana and Addis Ababa exchanged medium-level diplomatic representatives only in July, 1975, several months after the overthrow of the Ethiopian monarchy.

Only Soviet insistence led the Castro government to send tens of thousands of troops to fight in Ogaden, a barren Ethiopian province disputed by Somalia. Castro did not claim that the Communist party of Cuba had decided on its own to help the Ethiopian regime of Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam fight the Somali troops. His explanation for sending thousands of Cuban regular troops to Ethiopia was that late in November, 1977, when Somalian forces had practically conquered the entire Ogaden province, the Addis Ababa regime asked Havana for military assistance.

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George Volsky is a Miami-based journalist who has covered the Caribbean and Florida for *The New York Times* since 1962. Lecturer and consultant for the Rand Corporation, the Hoover Institution, and other research organizations, he has written about Cuban developments for various American and European publications. He is a columnist for the Agencia Latinoamericana, ALA, and his articles on national and international affairs appear regularly in over 80 newspapers in Latin America and Spain.

⁷Gabriel García Márquez, *Operacion Carlota* (Lima, Peru: Mosca Azul Editores, February, 1977).

⁸Foreign Affairs, summer, 1981, pp. 1028, 1034.

"For the Soviet Union, competition in Asia is enormously costly. The uncertain Afghan campaign and deployments along the Sino-Soviet border together tie down roughly 600,000 troops, while support for the embattled Afghan regime and for Vietnam's suzerainty over Indochina are expensive commitments."

China and the Soviet Union in Asia

BY RAJAN MENON

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University

BOOTH China and the Soviet Union claim to be the true representatives of a revolutionary ideology, and the polemics of the Sino-Soviet dispute possess the intensity of a vast theological schism.* Nevertheless, ideological issues are no longer so important as they were when Moscow and Beijing publicized their split in the early 1960's. Karl Marx has been displaced by Machiavelli; the cold and calculating pragmatism of *Realpolitik* has superseded the passion of revolutionary ideals as the motor of Sino-Soviet competition.

Nowhere is this change more clearly visible than in Asia, where shrill debates over international revolutionary obligations or the "correct" path to socialism no longer account for the rabidity of the dispute. Instead, Sino-Soviet rivalry manifests itself in more familiar and traditional ways: the backing of regional rivalries in South Asia and Indochina; China's efforts to persuade Japan and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to increase their military power; the massing of troops along the 4,000-mile Sino-Soviet border; China's campaign to insure that a diminished Western defense effort does not permit Soviet leaders to devote added resources and attention eastward; and Moscow's attempt to compound the threat Beijing perceives from the north by building up Indian and Vietnamese power on China's southern perimeter.

In terms of tangible power, Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia is unbalanced. Quite simply, the Chinese sorely lack the means to match the Soviet economic and military presence in the region. If economic difficulties and past disappointments have led Soviet leaders to become more frugal with foreign aid, China's limita-

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¹Calculated from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Foreign Assessment Center, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954-79*, ER 80—10318 U (October, 1980), Table A-6, pp. 19-20. Aid to Vietnam and North Korea are not included.

²U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1969-1978* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1980), Table 4, p. 160.

tions are even more severe. Thus, while Soviet economic aid to South Asia between 1954 and 1979 amounted to \$4.980 billion (with East Europe supplementing the commitment with \$1.245 billion), Chinese pledges totaled \$1.185 billion. In East Asia, given the hesitance that states in this area have shown about establishing contacts with the Communist states, both parties played a much smaller role, with the Soviet Union providing \$260 million (an amount once again added to by a \$550-million East European contribution) and the Chinese, \$335 million.¹

A similar picture emerges if one looks at arms sales to Asia. Moscow has been able to supply over \$3 billion to India, Afghanistan and Vietnam—states which it sees as pivotal for its Asian policy—while even for Pakistan, the largest recipient of its arms, China was able to provide only \$230 million in weapons.² China does not have the ability to mount large shipments of arms to back its friends in times of need as the Soviet Union did during such crises as the 1971 Bangladesh war, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in December, 1978, and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict of February, 1979. Further, given the worldwide trend toward transferring recently developed, technologically sophisticated weaponry, Asian states cannot look to China's outdated defense plants to balance the modern weapons that their rivals acquire from the Soviet Union. While it may want to build up Pakistan to counter Soviet-supplied India and Soviet-controlled Afghanistan, and to bolster the military capabilities of ASEAN against what it sees as a Soviet-directed Vietnamese quest for hegemony in Southeast Asia, China's ability to do so is constrained by both the capacity and the quality of its armament industries.

The same asymmetry is apparent in the Sino-Soviet military balance. Since the 1969 clash in the Ussuri River region of the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet Union has built up its military power in the Far East. Between 1967 and 1972, the number of Soviet divisions deployed along the Chinese border doubled to a present level of 46. One-fourth of the Soviet Union's ground forces and tactical aviation, 500,000 of its troops, and 11 percent of its military spending are now directed at China.³ In addition, the Trans-

Siberian Railway, which runs perilously close to the Chinese border, is being supplemented as a supply line to the Far East by the Baikal-Amur line situated more safely to the north and due for completion by 1985. In addition to increases in manpower and weapons, the military districts in the Sino-Soviet border area have been allotted competent commanders, a degree of operational autonomy sufficient to function if hostilities were to break out simultaneously against China and NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and a modern communications network. These conventional military assets are supplemented by the deployment of ICBM's, together with the new SS-20 mobile IRBM's and TU-22 Backfire bombers capable of striking China with nuclear weapons.⁴

Against this sizable military machine, the Chinese have only two advantages: the superiority in manpower conferred by their 1.2 million troops (this deployment against the Soviet Union accounts for roughly 40 percent of the People's Liberation Army);⁵ and the sheer size of a country that could draw a would-be conquerer into a protracted battle. But while these two qualities mean that China cannot be absorbed like an Afghanistan, there are drawbacks that severely limit Beijing's ability to compete with and contain Soviet power in Asia.

In firepower and mobility, China's infantry-dominated conventional strength badly trails the Soviet Union's; Chinese weapons are basically replicas of the weapons provided by the Soviets about 20 years ago.⁶ While the Soviet ability to project power by air and

sea ranks markedly behind that of the United States, it far exceeds China's. In naval strength, the Soviet Pacific fleet—headquartered at Vladivostok and second in size to the Northern fleet—must cope with some major problems. It has an adverse fleet size to littoral ratio, and choke points can be used by an enemy to confine a good portion of it in the Sea of Japan. The fleet is also hampered by the Soviet navy's lack of access to reliable overseas bases like Yokosuka, Subic Bay, and Diego Garcia, which are available to the United States navy. But it faces no real competition from China's navy. Because of the limited range and capability of China's ships, it is (despite its size) unable to approximate the Soviet Pacific fleet in tasks like sea lane control, amphibious operations, and distant deployment in areas like the Indian Ocean. Nor, unlike the Soviet Pacific fleet, can it mount nuclear strikes against the adversary's homeland.⁷

Sino-Soviet competition in Asia is characterized by a fundamental inequality of power. China is a developing nation and a regional power with definite global ambitions but with only potential. It faces in the Soviet Union a superpower with a much greater capacity for making its presence felt in the region at critical times and economic and military assets that give it a global reach.

If the nature of the Sino-Soviet balance of power has been somewhat belabored, it is because an exaggerated notion of China's current capabilities is not uncommon. Since the 1971-1972 Nixon-Kissinger** breakthrough to China, there has been steady progress in Sino-American relations. The process has been marked by several major events: the establishment of full diplomatic ties in January, 1979; the granting of most favored nation (MFN) status to China in early 1980; the decision in that year to sell "dual-use" technology to Beijing; and the June, 1981, announcement from Washington that the administration of Ronald Reagan would sell offensive arms to China.⁸ Because of the increasing attention devoted currently to the aims of Soviet foreign policy and because of the revival of a traditional romanticism about China's potential, it has become a commonplace to speak of the establishment of a triangular global power balance. But in terms of raw power, there really is no trilateral balance; China lacks the prowess to bring such an arrangement into being and, in the short run, the contribution that an infusion of Western arms can make to Chinese strength will be limited by the absorptive limits of China's aged defense industry and its reluctance—exhibited recently⁹—to incur large debts by making unrestrained purchases from abroad.

The Chinese are acutely aware of the superiority of Soviet power, and the militancy of their pronouncements on Soviet activities in Asia does not stem from delusions. Rather, the assertive tone and the aura of

**United States President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

³CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects* (June, 1978), reprinted in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1978*, 95th Congress, 2d Session (U.S. GPO, 1978), p. 22; Blechman testimony in *idem*, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1977*, 95th Congress, 1st Session (U.S. GPO, 1977), p. 147; George E. Hudson, "Current Soviet Security Policy and the Sino-Soviet Split," Mershon Center, Ohio State University, *Quarterly Report*, vol. 6, no. 2 (winter, 1981), p. 5.

⁴See John Erickson, "The Soviet Strategic Emplacement in Asia," *Asian Affairs*, vol. 12, pt. 1 (February, 1981), pp. 10-13.

⁵Hudson, "Current Soviet Security Policy," p. 5.

⁶International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1979* (London: IISS, 1980), "China's Defense Industries," pp. 67-72 for a fuller discussion.

⁷See Donald C. Daniel, "Sino-Soviet Relations in Naval Perspective," *Orbis*, vol. 24, no. 4 (winter, 1981), pp. 787-803.

⁸Chinese defense needs were an item for discussion between Haig and the Chinese during the Secretary of State's visit to Peking in June, 1981.

⁹In April, 1981, Peking cancelled \$2 billion in European, Japanese, and American projects planned for China. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 15, 1981, p. 4.

boldness are designed to project an image of toughness and resolve in order to deter Soviet expansion.¹⁰ Beijing also realizes that a China that is seen as cowed and weak will not be regarded by the United States as an attractive partner.

China's weakness precludes the containment of Soviet power in Asia by regional diplomacy alone. To be sure, Beijing's call for a greater military buildup by Japan and the ASEAN states shows an intent to marshal local centers of power. Nonetheless, neither the Japanese nor ASEAN—for different reasons—will be able to provide the necessary supplement to Chinese capabilities in the near future. Beijing's ambivalence about United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, its efforts to urge greater unity and expenditure within NATO, and the favorable attitude it has taken about the American military presence in the Pacific stem from three considerations. China must insure that a lessening of Western strength in the European theater does not permit Moscow to pursue its policies in Asia with greater strength and confidence. It needs closer ties with the United States and West Europe to create a constant uncertainty in the minds of the Soviet leadership about how the West would react to a Soviet attack against China. Finally, China wants the American military presence to make a greater contribution to the balance of power in Asia.

The Soviet naval presence in Asia that so worries the Chinese is not likely to diminish. The size of the Soviet Pacific fleet—which now amounts to 80 submarines and 80 warships—has grown in the last few years,¹¹ and its capabilities have been enhanced by the transfer to its command of two recently built ships: the aircraft carrier *Minsk* and the amphibious assault vessel *Ivan Rogov*. The access recently won by the Soviet Union to Vietnamese airfields and ports at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang has increased the Pacific fleet's sustainability, reach and reconnaissance capabilities. As a show of support for the Vietnamese,

¹⁰See Michael Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (winter, 1980-81), pp. 44-61.

¹¹IHSS, *The Military Balance*, 1979-1980, p. 11; *ibid.*, 1980-1981, p. 12.

¹²The U.S. is also helping to expand port and airfield facilities at Ras Banas in Egypt. Sadat has, on more than one occasion, volunteered access to Egyptian facilities in the event of a crisis.

¹³See for example, Ji Yanfeng, "Soviet Expansionist Strategy in the 'Dumbbell' Area," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), vol. 1, no. 127 (June 29, 1979), pp. C2-C4; Dan Lin, "Contention Between Superpowers in the Indian Ocean," *ibid.*, vol. 1, no. 113 (June 11, 1979), pp. C1-C2.

¹⁴The background to the intervention has been treated extensively and will not be discussed here. For details see, *inter alia*, Selig Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 41 (winter, 1980-81), pp. 163-187; and Ronald R. Rader, "The Russian Military and Afghanistan: An Historical Perspective," *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, vol. 4 (1980), pp. 308-327.

Soviet leaders have periodically maintained a naval presence in the South China Sea since the Sino-Vietnamese war and, in February, 1980, two missile cruiser task forces drawn from the Pacific fleet appeared in the Arabian Sea to monitor the two American carrier task forces that were sent there after the seizure of the United States embassy in Teheran.

The Soviet Union has had a permanent naval deployment in the Indian Ocean since 1968, and there is little likelihood of a diminished Soviet presence in the region. The loss of access to the Somalian port of Berbera in 1977 has been offset by relying on Aden, and the facilities in Vietnam will reduce the logistical difficulties for the Indian Ocean task force that is drawn from the Pacific Fleet headquartered at distant Vladivostok. Between June, 1977, and February, 1978, ultimately fruitless negotiations were held between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean. There is little likelihood of any imminent resumption. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a chill has enveloped the superpower relationship and, as part of its "get tough" foreign policy, the Reagan administration has decided to expand American naval power and retain the access to facilities at Kenya, Oman and Somalia that was negotiated under President Jimmy Carter.¹²

Chinese assessments of the naval rivalry in the Indian and Pacific Oceans do contain terse and somewhat ritualistic criticism of the Western presence. But Beijing, anxious about what it sees as an increasingly powerful Soviet navy and aware that its navy cannot serve as an effective counter, views Western naval strength as an essential balancer and deterrent to what is seen as a premeditated Soviet effort to control the "dumbbell" area formed by the Straits of Malacca and the two great bodies of water to its east and west.¹³

SOUTH ASIA: THE INTERVENTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Having sent its troops into Afghanistan in December, 1979, to rescue the wobbly Marxist regime that had come to power there 20 months earlier,¹⁴ the Soviet Union has reaped a bitter and plentiful harvest of international criticism. The two condemnatory General Assembly resolutions of January and November, 1980, were supported by a large majority. Likewise, at the conferences of Islamic foreign ministers that convened in Islamabad, Pakistan, in January and May, only Syria and South Yemen were in the Soviet corner. A display of anger that was more painful came when some 80 states boycotted the Olympic games, which Moscow had organized with great pride. More specifically, the image that even sympathetic developing countries have of the U.S.S.R. has been markedly affected by the events in Afghanistan; unlike Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan hit closer to home.

In two important and overlapping constituencies, the nonaligned movement and the Muslim world,¹⁵ the Soviet Union has been isolated and left with but few defenders.

If the awesome use of Soviet military power has been a failure, it is because the problem is political. The government of Babrak Karmal is viewed by most Afghans as the creature of an imperial neighbor. And the continued presence of Soviet troops, their destruction of villages and croplands, and the periodic drives to recruit men for military service only harden this image.¹⁶ On the other hand, any significant reduction of Soviet forces in order to allow Karmal to gain legitimacy might quickly lead to his overthrow. The Soviets are trapped in a vicious circle.

While Moscow has learned why the old adage about it being easier to march into Afghanistan than to march out has survived through the years, the future of the resistance is uncertain. The six Afghan political groups in Pakistan have cooperated to draw up a charter and to establish what can loosely be called a government-in-exile.¹⁷ Inside the country, the resistance is shaping along tribal lines and reports indicate that traditional tribal rivalries are being shelved to solidify the war effort.

What is likely in the foreseeable future is not a victory by either side but a stalemate. In October, 1980, Karmal visited Moscow and there were indications that Soviet leaders complained privately about the state of the Afghan army, the problems of the economy, and the often violent disputes between the Khalq and Parcham wings of the ruling People's Democratic party. But despite mounting casualties and high costs, the Soviet Union has given no public indication of a flagging commitment.¹⁸

The primary Chinese response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been a diplomatic campaign—by means of bilateral visits and China's news media, and by keeping the issue alive in the United Nations—to portray the invasion as part of a deliberate Soviet effort to control the Persian Gulf and bolster the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean

¹⁵Since the invasion, the Soviets have sought to stress their friendship toward the Islamic states. See Gromyko's speech to Soviet voters, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (CDSP), vol. 32, no. 7 (March 19, 1980), pp. 1-3.

¹⁶Eliza Van Hollen, "Afghanistan: A Year of Occupation," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Special Report*, no. 79 (February, 1981).

¹⁷W. Eric Gustafson and William L. Richter, "Pakistan in 1980: Weathering the Storm," *Asian Survey*, vol. 21, no. 2 (February, 1981), pp. 163-4.

¹⁸Estimates suggest about 15,000 Soviets killed and wounded. The reliability of such figures are not verifiable. If correct, these low casualty figures suggest that the Soviets have relied on armor and helicopter attacks against the resistance rather than counterguerrilla tactics.

¹⁹For example, the \$1.9-billion Indo-Soviet arms deal of May, 1980.

through an ultimate southward push aimed at wresting control of facilities on the coastline of the Arabian Sea. In short, the Chinese have tried to drive home the point that the crisis directly affects the United States, West Europe, Japan and the Muslim world, and that it is not a local problem. In keeping with this overall strategy, they have called for greater unity in South Asia, pointing out that the propinquity of Soviet power poses a threat not only to Pakistan, but to India as well. Beijing welcomed the 1979-1980 consultations between Indian and Pakistani officials on the Afghan issue and called simultaneously, and with some naiveté, for increasing Pakistan's military strength and for a rapprochement between India and Pakistan.

To provide a propitious setting for mending fences between India and Pakistan, since the Afghan invasion China has taken a more evenhanded position on the long-standing disputes between these two South Asian states and has made an effort to improve Sino-Indian relations as well. While taking care to maintain their frequent contacts with, and support for, Pakistan, the Chinese have realized that an India that continues to view China as hostile and as a partisan of Pakistan is unlikely, Afghanistan notwithstanding, to reassess its close ties with the U.S.S.R.

Despite India's solid stake in maintaining these ties with the Soviet Union,¹⁹ it also has an interest in normalizing relations with China, at the least to avoid being taken for granted in Moscow and to acquire some flexibility in foreign policy. For their part, the Chinese would welcome normalization both for its own sake and because it holds out the possibility of a future weakening of Indo-Soviet relations. It is this mutual desire for movement in Sino-Indian relations that made possible Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's June, 1981, visit to New Delhi—which had been delayed by Indian recognition of the Kampuchean regime. During Huang's stay in India, it was revealed that Gandhi had been invited to China and that an agreement had been reached for future negotiations on the border problem.

Some Indians have argued that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coupled with the restiveness of Pakistan's ethnic minorities—primarily the Baluchis—pose a threat to Pakistan's integrity that also augurs ill for India. They have suggested that India take the initiative to fashion a regional center of power by reaching an understanding with China and Pakistan. If this plan has not been pursued with any great vigor, there are two explanations. The first is that the complex disagreements that India has with China and Pakistan cannot be quickly settled; the suspicions, entrenched perceptions, and domestic complications in all three countries pose formidable obstacles to speedy diplomacy. In addition, it is India's primary concern that the Soviet move into Afghanistan will lead the United States to arm China and Pakistan. To

cope with this eventuality, India will not impair, let alone jettison, what it regards as a tried and trusted friendship with Soviet leaders who have provided arms and political support at crucial junctures—on the Kashmir issue and during the Bangladesh crisis, for instance.

These considerations explain India's cautious response to the Afghan crisis. This has ranged from Gandhi's initial suggestion that "other interventions" in Afghanistan explained the Soviet action and Indian abstention from the two condemnatory United Nations General Assembly resolutions, to innocuously worded calls for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, unlike Cuba, Vietnam and Ethiopia, India has not supported the Soviet invasion and, during the many recent visits exchanged by Indian and Soviet officials, has privately but persistently expressed its unhappiness at the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. During the visits to New Delhi of Soviet leaders Andrei Gromyko and Leonid Brezhnev (February and December, 1980), the two sides simply agreed to disagree and the communiqüs omitted any direct reference to the matter.²⁰

However, India will not drastically reevaluate its ties with the Soviet Union in the near future. In addition to distancing itself from the Soviet position on Afghanistan, India has also been diversifying its arms purchases and has been trying to reduce its heavy dependence (between 1967 and 1977 the Soviet Union provided 81.2 percent of the value of all arms purchased by India) on the Soviet Union. In October, 1978, a \$2-billion accord was signed for the purchase and local manufacture of the Anglo-French Jaguar fighter bomber and, in October, 1980, an Indian delegation visited Canada and the United States to examine antitank weapons, howitzers and antiaircraft systems. While this does denote a decision to eschew total dependence on the Soviet Union, it does not necessarily portend any major reduction in the important role that the U.S.S.R. has played in selling arms to India for the past 15 years. Thus, despite the trend toward diversifying procurement, a \$1.7-billion deal

²⁰CDSP, vol. 32, no. 7 (March, 1980), pp. 14, 24; *ibid.*, vol. 32, no. 50 (January 14, 1981), pp. 7, 23.

²¹On Indian arms purchases see Rajan Menon, "The Military and Security Dimensions of Soviet-Indian Relations," in Robert H. Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 232-250; Mohan Ram, "Indo-Soviet Arms Deal," *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 31, 1980, pp. 953-954.

²²Five million Baluchis are divided among Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf, and the Baluch area commands 900 miles of the Arabian seacoast. See Selig Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry," *International Security*, vol. 5, no. 3 (winter, 1980-81), pp. 152-163. On Pakistani foreign policy in the wake of the Afghan invasion, see Lord Saint Brides, "New Perspectives South of the Hindu Kush," *ibid.*, pp. 164-170.

involving the most favorable terms that the Soviet Union has ever given to India was concluded between the two countries in May, 1980.²¹

The favorable credit terms that Soviet leaders have been willing to extend, plus their abiding interest in building up India as a counterweight to China, will insure the continued prominence of the Soviet Union as a supplier. The announcement, in June, 1981, that the United States has agreed "in principle" to sell arms to China and the United States' decision to offer a \$3.2-billion package in economic and military aid to Pakistan is viewed by India not as a part of American strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but in relation to the effect that an increment in Chinese and Pakistani military power will have on India's security. The Indian response will certainly not be to distance itself from the Soviet Union.

In Pakistan, a siege mentality has emerged with the sudden destruction of the Afghan buffer that separated it from the Soviet Union. Pakistan's old fear of a hostile Soviet-Indian entente has been aggravated by a belief that, in an effort to expand further south, the Soviet Union will ultimately support Baluchi irredentism or seek to Finlandize Pakistan. Although they are joined by the Chinese in this assessment, the Pakistans are aware that China can do little to prevent any such eventuality. While maintaining its close ties with the Chinese, Pakistan has increasingly identified with the Muslim countries, principally Saudi Arabia.²² This is, in part, a foreign policy strategy complementing President Zia ul-Haq's plans to establish an Islamic polity in Pakistan; but it is also an attempt to acquire political support and financial aid from an important center of power. Further, some constituents of the Islamic world, like Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria, hold great importance in the Soviet scheme of things, and Zia may believe that anticipating adverse reactions from these states may moderate whatever malevolent aims the Soviet Union may have against his country.

An unstable situation exists in Pakistan because of the dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities and the sizable opposition to Zia's cancellation—on two occasions since taking power in 1977—of promised elections, the incarceration of political opponents, and the hobbling of an independent judiciary. Conscious of this, aware of the proximity of Soviet power, and exposed to frequent allegations from Moscow and Kabul that United States and Chinese agents are training Afghan rebels in Pakistani camps, the Zia regime has displayed a mixture of resolve and caution. Pakistan has played a key role in organizing the criticism that the

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Rajan Menon has contributed to *Asian Survey*, *Current History*, *Osteuropa*, *Soviet Studies* (forthcoming), and to edited volumes on Soviet politics.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II: IMPERIAL AND GLOBAL. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1981. 296 pages and index, \$15.00, cloth; 9.95, paper.)

This comprehensive, highly readable analysis provides an historical-political overview of the evolution, aims and impact of Soviet foreign policy, with particular attention to developments since 1945. The organization is topical, with chapters devoted to East Europe, West Europe, the Far East, the world Communist movement, and the third world.

O.E.S.

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Seweryn Bialer. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981. 441 pages, \$35.00, cloth; \$15.00, paper.)

This collection of essays discusses the various aspects of Soviet internal politics that influence the formulation of foreign policy. A distinguished series of scholars examines the dynamics of Soviet economic, social, political, and intra-bloc factors. There is a great deal of solid information, and the book will be of interest to anyone studying Soviet foreign policy.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

SOVIET DECISION MAKING IN PRACTICE: THE USSR AND ISRAEL 1947-1953. By Yaacov Ro'i. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980. 540 pages, bibliography and index, \$22.50.)

A work of impressive scholarship, this study describes the purport and evolution of Soviet-Israeli relations in the decade after World War II. It analyzes the shifts in Soviet policy toward the establishment of a Jewish state and the role that Moscow played in the survival of Israel in the critical years after the United Nations voted to partition Palestine. Based on a thorough assessment of all available documents, it tells a dramatic story in rich and absorbing detail.

A.Z.R.

VIETNAM: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW, PEKING, WASHINGTON. By Daniel S. Papp. (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 1981. 258 pages and index, \$17.95.)

This study does justice to the complexity of

United States, Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Vietnam War. The author traces the perceptions and policies of the three great powers and contrasts the lessons each learned from the experience, which was multidimensional in character. This is an informative, useful addition to the literature on the Vietnam War.

A.Z.R.

THE DIPLOMACY OF SILENCE: THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE COLD WAR, 1933-1947. By Hugh De Santis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. 270 pages, bibliography and index, \$23.00.)

This study examines the differing images of the Soviet Union held by United States foreign service officers, especially in the years from 1944 to 1947, and the role that these views played in shaping policy responses to the U.S.S.R. The evaluation of the cultural, ideological, historical and institutional influences that socialized an important stratum of the United States foreign policy elite contributes to an understanding of the origins of the cold war.

A.Z.R.

THE TERROR NETWORK: THE SECRET WAR OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. By Claire Sterling. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981. 357 pages, notes, sources and index, \$13.95.)

A distinguished veteran foreign correspondent has written an absorbing account of the seemingly random and unconnected incidents that are, in fact, a functioning international network of terrorism. Through a combination of persistent probing, court testimony and extensive interviewing, she documents the relationships between various terrorist groups, illuminates the Soviet involvement, and assesses its threat to democratic countries. This is a timely book.

A.Z.R.

RUSSIA'S FAILED REVOLUTIONS: FROM THE DECEMBRISTS TO THE DISSIDENTS. By Adam Ulam. (New York: Basic Books, 1981. 453 pages, references and index, \$18.95.)

This rich and detailed history of the struggle for political and intellectual freedom in Russia, by the eminent historian Adam B. Ulam, raises a challenging question: "What is it that at decisive moments has frustrated the libertarian intentions of Russia's revolutionaries and reformers?" Until now, the revolutionary tradition in Russia has been unable

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THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION

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It was at this juncture [said Castro later] that a situation arose where only resolute and determined international help to support the heroic struggle of the Ethiopian people would have saved the independence, territorial integrity and the revolution in their country.⁹

This time, Castro did not pretend that Cuba organized its Ethiopian military operation. Shortly before Christmas, 1977, thousands of Cuban soldiers were flown to Ethiopia aboard Soviet transport planes, in a massive airlift coordinated by Moscow. As Soviet planes with Cuban soldiers were landing in Addis Ababa, other Soviet planes were transporting MiG airplanes, tanks, artillery, trucks and light equipment, all standard arms for the Cuban armed forces. In all, about 15,000 heavily armed Cuban soldiers fought in Ethiopia; and it was they and not the Ethiopian soldiers who defeated the Somali army in Ogaden in a series of battles that ended by February, 1978.

SOVIET-CUBAN COOPERATION

In 1975, Havana organized a meeting of 24 Communist Latin American parties at which Castro laid down directives from Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev. China's Chairman Mao Zedong rather than the President of the United States was the gathering's chief villain. Conversely, Soviet leaders, who once expressed reservations about Cuban policies, could find nothing wrong with the Castro revolutionary government.

The great historical merit of the Cuban revolution lies in the fact that it joined together the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete reality of Latin America, that it represented yet another important confirmation of the fact that, as Fidel Castro correctly pointed out, "a true revolution, true independence in our era can only be based on socialist, anti-imperialist, internationalist principles."¹⁰

In a speech during Fidel Castro's 1972 visit to the Soviet Union, Brezhnev put it even more strongly:

Socialist Cuba is not alone: it represents a firm and integral part of the world system of socialism. Its international position, its interest and security are reliably defended not only by the firm policy of the Communist party of Cuba and the heroism of its revolutionary people, but also by the support . . . of the U.S.S.R. and other nations of the socialist community.¹¹

At the same time, Moscow announced that Cuba had joined the COMECON, the Communist bloc's economic organization.

The Cuban government, recognizing its depen-

dence on Soviet assistance for its foreign military ventures, has indignantly rejected the notion that it has been a pawn rather than a junior partner in Moscow's worldwide strategic game. However, Cuba's open-ended involvement in Angola and Ethiopia has not proved advantageous to the Castro government. All reports from Cuba indicate that service in Africa, once a duty sought by young Cubans, is now regarded as punishment. Many soldiers and civilian technicians have reportedly died either from tropical diseases or from military action in Africa. Dengue fever, a contagious disease that broke out in 1981 in Cuba and claimed dozens of lives (with close to 250,000 cases of its severe symptoms officially reported), may have been the African variety brought to the island by returning soldiers.

What has Cuba received in return for its African involvement, other than accolades from Moscow and gratitude from the regimes it has helped to maintain in power? Very little. Havana's bid to become a dominant force in the third world was adversely affected; Cuba was no longer perceived by the non-aligned nations as a poor, brave, independent country under siege. Even though few countries criticized Cuba for its African involvement, even fewer applauded the Castro government for it.

CARIBBEAN INVOLVEMENT

The crisis in the Caribbean has offered the Soviet Union and Cuba several opportunities to extend Communist influence in that area. Cuba gave only marginal help to the revolutionary forces that fought and defeated the Nicaraguan dictatorship of General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, and Havana only began sending arms to the rebels when their victory was well in sight. But Fidel Castro has maintained close personal relations with the Marxist leaders of the victorious Sandinista movement, who dominated the Managua government after Somoza's downfall in July, 1979. Thus Cuba was able to place many medium-level civilian and military advisers in Nicaragua, and the political influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union has begun to grow, despite the fact that Communist economic assistance to Nicaragua has been very modest.

Moscow and Havana have had less success in El Salvador where conditions were apparently ripe for the installation of another Marxist regime. In the fall of 1980, Fidel Castro was instrumental in uniting various leftist factions fighting the rightist Salvadoran army. Shipments of weapons were also arranged by Cuba, and the Salvadoran rebels intended to launch their "final offensive" in January, 1981. The offensive failed because the Salvadoran army fought better than the Somoza troops and because (unlike the situation in Nicaragua) the bulk of the population refused to

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⁹Granma, March 16, 1978.

¹⁰Pravda, July 4, 1972.

¹¹Ibid., July 28, 1972.

THE SOVIET MILITARY REAPPRAISED

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Some administration supporters insisted on exaggerating their concerns to such an extent that they repelled potential sympathizers. Statements that the Soviet navy is now twice the size of the United States navy is a case in point. One does not lump inshore, coastal vessels with battleships, cruisers and aircraft carriers.¹⁹ The United States retains a nearly two-to-one advantage in tonnage. Moscow today has significant distant naval interventionary potential, which it did not have ten years ago. But United States aircraft carriers alone contain much more interventionary potency.

Unfortunately, such overstatement and the response that it necessitates merely cloud the issue. In most cases (short of Armageddon), the Soviet navy does not need equality. The Soviet interventions in Angola and Ethiopia are illustrative. In both cases, Washington could have brought greater power to bear. The United States was deterred not by Soviet military prowess but by political constraints. In Angola, Moscow could purport to champion the causes of anti-colonialism and anti-apartheid; in Ethiopia, it appeared in the guise of defender against (Somali) aggression. In both cases, even Washington's allies in Africa felt obliged to condone the Soviet presence. It was this political context that led Congress to veto large-scale action in Angola and that stayed Washington's hand three years later. Future situations are likely to be analogous. The ability to use and manipulate political currents and the correlation of local (native) force elements are likely to prove weightier on the scales than any crude balance of naval force alone.²⁰

So also with administration statements blaming Moscow for all the world's terrorism. The discrepancy between assertion and reality was too blatant: the pages of the *Miami Herald* were full of reports of anti-Castro and other self-styled guerrilla (terrorist?) groups acquiring combat training in the Everglades, the Catholic Church, Amnesty International and other sources had documented indigenous state and other terrorism in Latin America, the Middle East and elsewhere; indeed, the CIA itself was in the process of concluding a study tracing the variety and complexity

¹⁹The annual *Jane's Fighting Ships* (London), provides data on naval ship numbers and characteristics.

²⁰C. G. Jacobsen, *Soviet Strategic Initiatives*, see especially ch. 3, 4 and 8.

²¹"Soviet Aid Disputed in Terrorism Study," *The New York Times*, March 29, 1981.

²²See for example R. B. Laird's "The All-Volunteer Force: It Isn't Working," *International Security Review*, Spring, 1981.

of terrorist support and inspiration.²¹ There is no question that in the past Moscow has embraced and pursued non-conventional strategies (ranging from ideological subversion through industrial espionage to instances of sabotage and, *in extremis*, terrorism) as part and parcel of the deliberate manufacture of a deterrence image, and hence a freedom to maneuver, that has been far out of proportion to real Soviet strength. The current status of this unorthodox component of Moscow's military-political stance warrants attention. But ludicrous exaggerations merely invite mockery, diverting attention from the real problem(s).

The image of unremitting Soviet success in expanding influence and empire is equally unfortunate. Yes, apparent success in Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen did give Soviet power a global credibility that it had previously lacked, and the supporting role played by Cuba and, to a lesser extent, other allies again pointed to the fact that Soviet power projection was not one-dimensional. Yet Moscow would surely have been happy to give up all the gains of the 1970's if it could undo the split with China. And then there is the long list of others who "got away": Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia, Guinea, Iraq, Chile(?), North Korea, Romania (?), Poland (?).

Many supposed Soviet victories are brittle. Angola, for example, has jailed or expelled the most pro-Soviet elements within the ruling MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), perpetuated Gulf Oil's monopoly over oil production, and extended its hospitality to Western multinationals to other areas of industrial development; in Ethiopia, Moscow's oft-expressed preference for a ruling party organized along traditional lines remains unsatisfied. Western allies and "proxies" are as active as Moscow's in Africa. The late 1970's saw French troops operating in as many nations as Cuban troops. And while France sometimes pursued independent rationales for intervention, so on occasion did Cuba. Referring again to the Ogaden (Ethiopian-Somali) War of 1978, it is worth remembering that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia expressed their willingness to act as United States allies in support of Mogadishu; Washington's ultimately restraining hand reflected an unfavorable conjunction of political facts, not military force.

By 1980, there could be no doubt that United States military power was suffering from a number of flaws.²² Purported deficiencies in the strategic arena were less credible. The fact that 90 percent of the Reagan administration's dramatic defense budget boost was allocated to conventional arms indicates that even the new administration was inclined to accept this point, in private if not in public (and this inference is further supported by evidence of renewed skepticism towards the gigantic MX missile program).

The real problems revolved around the volunteer

forces' inability to attract sufficient numbers and quality. The shortage of mid-level specialists, midshipmen, mechanics, engineers and the like meant that ships were not able to put to sea; there were restrictions on flying hours, and other encumbrances. Little thought had been given to the civilian economy's ability to retool for military emergencies, and its ability to do so at short notice had clearly been impaired. As concerns interventionary prospects, the United States army did not have a canteen large enough to hold the minimum daily water ration required for areas like the Middle East; new tanks are

so big and heavy that only one tank at a time can be transported by the Air Force's biggest plane, the C-5A; at the moment the Pentagon wants 7,000 M-1 tanks, but the United States has only 77 C-5A planes.²³

Yet such problems and anomalies are self-made; they are not the result of Soviet scheming. The Soviet armed forces' organization and practice suffer analogous contrasts between theory and reality.²⁴ The Soviet bureaucratic process throws up its own gremlins of mismanagement, bottlenecks and short-circuits. Other United States problems find their counterparts in the combination of Siberian isolation, boredom and vodka. And the trend towards disproportionate minority representation among United States ranks is mirrored by the demographically ordained "Asianization" of Soviet forces.

The only real uncertainty in the strategic arena lies in questionable prospects for decisive breakthroughs in laser and particle beam technologies, breakthroughs that might allow for truly effective ballistic missile defense systems (BMD).²⁵ Either side could deploy a million additional cruise missiles or MX's, yet this would not negate the other's ability effectively to obliterate the aggressor's society. Revolutionary BMD concepts are in a different league, since they would strike at the heart of the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) core of the present balance. Although most scientists remained highly dubious, this was the one strategic domain where advocates of increased contingency research spending could bring compelling logic to their cause. Conversely, of course, the extreme danger to each superpower of the possibility that the other might succeed (or appear to succeed) in effecting unilateral advantage could be

²³ *Newsweek*, June 8, 1981, p. 29.

²⁴ "Soviet Armed Forces Showing Weaknesses in Several Key Areas," *The New York Times*, December 9, 1980; and note Secretary of Defense H. Brown's testimony, as reported in the *Chicago Tribune*, October 14, 1980.

²⁵ See for example John Parmentola and Kosta Tsipis, "Particle Beam Weapons," *Scientific American*, April, 1979; Richard Burt, "Experts Believe Laser Weapons Could Transform Warfare in 80's," *The New York Times*, February 10, 1980; and contrast with "Beam Weapons Technology Expanding" section, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, May 25, 1981.

seen as a powerful argument for arms control negotiations of substance.

So why the extremism of the administration's posture; if so many of the military and military-political arguments on which it rests are so open to challenge? The answer, one presumes, is psychological: the perceived need to counter the image of rampant and unchecked Soviet imperialism. The illusion of Soviet invincibility and United States emasculation appears to be widely accepted, although the real story of Soviet power projection is far more checkered, and although the real potency of United States power remains awesome. Again, for the most part, the wound is self-inflicted. The credit for the widespread currency enjoyed by these flawed myths must be shared by the Soviet propaganda apparatus and Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) and other American opinion makers who, for their own domestic political purposes, have chosen to insist, ever since 1972, that Soviet power was overtaking United States capabilities. It is doubtful whether so many third world audiences, audiences socialized to automatic assumptions of British, French and American pre-eminence, would have conceived of Soviet superiority had not a bevy of American senators and politicians tutored them to that effect. Nevertheless, if one believes that the damage has been done, then one is also compelled to sympathize with the new administration's belief that a major show of machismo and determination is necessary, not on military grounds but for psychological reasons, to counter false assumptions about United States strength and American will.

There is a dynamic afoot, however, which promises both to cramp the administration's ability to reach its goals and at the same time to help ensure that its fears of unbridled Soviet success will never be realized. There are two elements to this dynamic. On the one hand, there is the chorus of skepticism that now greets American ideological pretensions, skepticism bred through years of American support for regimes that continue to top the lists of the contemporary world's worst human rights violators compiled by Amnesty International. This skepticism has been complemented in recent years by the third world's increasingly disillusioned view of Soviet ideological pretensions. The pro-forma bias of Soviet ideology—the emphasis on economic liberation and its corollary that human rights aspirations are diversionary if not preceded by the establishment of job and social security guarantees—was clearly in accord with most of the world's thinking until the penultimate decade of the 20th century. But the perception of genuine ideological commitment of the kind that might have made allegiance to Moscow a matter of the heart has been whittled away by contradictory behavior in places like Egypt (where Russian boorishness and chauvinism

seemed little different from that previously exhibited by the British), Zaire (where the promise of Western opposition sufficed to deter aid to "liberation" ventures), Afghanistan (where Moscow is faced with a genuine "war of national liberation"), and Poland (with regard to which the Soviet stance appears a carbon copy of the policies of Tsars Nicholas the First and Alexander the Second).²⁶

The most arresting phenomenon of the third world today is the degree to which church advocates are consciously disassociating themselves from Washington and Marxists, from Moscow.²⁷ Both powers continue to attempt to influence, infiltrate and manipulate the respective groupings. But their general inability and impotence to do so is a profound reflection of the cynicism that their past policies have generated.

The dangerous trend toward a degree of political anarchy reinforces the second element in the dynamic: namely, the trend toward military anarchy. The 1970's witnessed the emergence of sophisticated weaponry made so inexpensive and simple that its proliferation can no longer be controlled. The trend, first manifested in 1973 when Egypt's still largely peasant army proved capable of utilizing SAM missiles, pointed directly to a future of far more lethally armed militias, guerrillas and terrorists. By 1980, third world arsenals had mushroomed; and a frightening number of nations stand on the threshold of acquiring rudimentary nuclear capabilities. The superpowers retain their ability to obliterate, but their scope for lower-level control options is being squeezed. ■

²⁶See this author's "The Nuclear Era: Perception and Reality—A Century Apart?" forthcoming; and D. R. Jones' excellent "Russian Military Traditions and the Soviet Military Establishment," presented to USAF sponsored conference on *The Soviet Union, What Lies Ahead*, Reston, Va., September, 1980, to be published as part of conference proceedings.

²⁷See for example S. Meikle, "Has Marxism a Future?" *Critique* (Glasgow), no. 13, spring, 1981, pp. 103-122; and "Brazil Church's Voice of Dissent Growing," in "Around the Americans," *The Miami Herald*, April 19, 1981.

THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD

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ons from the Soviet Union, though the relationship was kept to a minimum. It was from Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, Qadaffi's political inspiration and guru, that Qadaffi learned the policy of diversifying arms suppliers.

Qadaffi's attitude shifted after the 1973 October War, when he quarreled with Sadat over the conduct of the war and Egypt's subsequent abrupt turn to the United States. In May, 1974, a Libyan delegation headed by Abdel Salaam Jalloud, the number two

man on the all-powerful Revolutionary Command Council, concluded a major arms agreement in Moscow. The joint communiqué, signed at the end of the visit, also established an intergovernmental committee to expand trade and technical cooperation and identified a commonality of interest against "imperialism, Zionism, and reaction," code words signifying opposition to the United States and to all efforts to negotiate a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Soon thereafter, Moscow shipped enormous quantities of advanced weaponry to Libya, and many Soviet and East European advisers and technicians. Several considerations entered into Soviet calculations. First, as a result of the leap-frogging of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil prices, Libya could pay for the weapons in hard currency, which Moscow needed to help finance its imports of technology and grain from the West. Second, Libya's need for Soviet assistance in learning how to use the weapons paved the way for the establishment of a broad-based Soviet presence in Libya. The relationship with Libya has also provided the Soviet navy with some access to port privileges, which it lacked after Sadat terminated all Soviet military privileges in Egypt in March, 1976.

Third, Libya's hostility to United States peace initiatives in the Middle East aligned Moscow with the anti-Western coalition of Arab states and gave it a role in Arab-world politics. Qadaffi's radical line suited the Soviet objective of exacerbating and exploiting regional rivalries. Finally, Libya's dependence on the Soviet protective shield enabled Moscow to entrench itself on the North African littoral. In a real sense, it is Moscow that makes Qadaffi's machinating in central Africa and international terrorism possible. For example, Qadaffi's support for the Ethiopian revolution, his attempts to prop up Idi Amin's genocidal regime in Uganda, and his intriguing in Chad all depended in large measure on the crucial assistance and support of the Soviet Union.

For the moment, Qadaffi has not granted the Soviets any unrestricted military bases in Libya, but Moscow is obviously building for the future and adapts to unfolding opportunities. Its support was doubtless one of the factors that restrained the Egyptians from pressing their punitive attacks on Libyan military facilities in August, 1977. Moscow may have hoped these attacks would make Qadaffi more amenable to an expanded Soviet bloc presence (East Germans, for example, already serve as his palace guards), which would be recompense enough.

Qadaffi has made several visits to the Soviet Union, most recently in late April, 1981. The arms relationship is quite extensive. However, Qadaffi is erratic, capricious and unpredictable—not at all the kind of leader on whom Moscow likes to pin its hopes. The convergence of interests keeps the two sides

engaged but wary; and Moscow hopes to be well positioned to take advantage of any sudden upheaval that may bring about a change of leadership in Libya.

OBSERVATIONS

Soviet support for the Arab confrontation states has been openhanded and consistent, enabling them to oppose the Camp David peace process, the Egyptian-Israeli reconciliation, and the United States quest for military bases in the area. In the short term, the benefits often redound more to the advantage of the local recipients of Soviet aid than to Moscow itself; however, on occasion, the Soviet leadership obtains a dividend, most recently, on the issue of Afghanistan.

Moscow's Arab clients—Syria's Assad, the PLO's Arafat and the PDRY's Ali Nasir Mohammad—have frustrated the Muslim world's efforts to mount a strong campaign against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. For example, at the Islamic summit conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in January, 1981, the Saudis were unable to organize a consensus for their strong declaration that had been designed to please the administration of United States President Ronald Reagan. The Saudis were hoping that their resolution would lead the United States to accede to their wishes on Israel and that it would unify all Muslims against the U.S.S.R.

The resolution, calling on Moscow to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and permit the Afghan people to choose their own government, was undermined by Yasir Arafat. His pay-off to Moscow for its support of the PLO was evident in his suggestion, which prevailed over the Saudi proposal:

We believe that it is both necessary and useful that we work with the Soviet Union so that we can reduce tension in that part of the Islamic world in such a way as to ensure Afghanistan's independence, nonalignment, and good relations with its neighboring states. We should accept the assurances of our friends in the Soviet Union that the presence of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan is a temporary matter and that Soviet forces will be withdrawn at the appropriate time.⁷

The Soviet aim in the Arab world is primarily to undermine the strategic-economic position of the United States. It is this that impels Soviet activism and ambitions in the area. ■

SOVIET POLICY IN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

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others). These were supplemented by statements of individual third world governments.

This nearly unanimous condemnation of the "colonialism of the East" has been a devastating blow to

⁷As quoted in Jon Kimche, "An Islamic 'Munich,'" *Midstream*, vol. 27, no. 4 (April, 1981), p. 5.

Soviet prestige from which the U.S.S.R. is not likely to recover for a long time to come. In this sense, Afghanistan is different from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Poland. Unlike the East European satellites, Afghanistan was a nonaligned, Muslim, third world country and regardless of the Soviet party-line explanations, it is generally recognized that the invasion was caused by the Kabul government's refusal to obey Soviet orders. Moreover, unlike military operations in East Europe, the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist guerrillas, disorganized and ill-armed though they have been, have not been brought to heel by the Soviet forces now stationed in Afghanistan. The large-scale introduction of additional troops would probably "pacify" the countryside, but only at the expense of renewed pressure from the third world and the threat of a major United States involvement. For these reasons, the military situation in Afghanistan has not undergone any major changes over the past 18 months, and the serious restraints on the Soviet Union's freedom of action in Afghanistan are painfully obvious to Soviet leaders even if they are mostly disregarded in the West.

Future Soviet prospects in Afghanistan must be judged as bleak. The PDPA and the armed forces—the two mainstays of Communist control—are in a state of disarray, necessitating the presence of Soviet troops and political and economic advisers in Kabul. Under the present circumstances, the overthrow of the pro-Soviet Marxist regime in Afghanistan is impossible, but a solution to the problem that would satisfy Moscow is equally remote. On the global chessboard of armchair strategists, Afghanistan may appear to be an important piece, whose control may enable the U.S.S.R. to check, or even checkmate, the West in the vital Persian Gulf region. To the Kremlin, in contrast, the invasion represents a major policy failure as well as an ongoing burden that must and will be carried until a solution acceptable to Moscow can be worked out. As stated in the joint Soviet-Afghani declaration of October 16, 1980, the Soviet Union's "limited military contingent" will not be withdrawn until "the aggression" against Afghanistan ceases and "guarantees are given that the subversive activities from abroad will not be resumed." In short, along with major foreign policy difficulties that the Kremlin is experiencing in East Europe, in the Far East and, above all, in its relations with the Reagan administration, Afghanistan is likely to remain a considerable problem for the U.S.S.R. for some time to come. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

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to cope with nationalism, which has always been used as a weapon by autocratic regimes in Russia.

O.E.S.

TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SOVIET-WESTERN RELATIONS. By Philip Hanson. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 259 pages, notes and index, \$30.00.)

This study of Soviet imports of Western technology in the post-Stalin era sets in perspective the importance of these imports to the Soviet Union. The options for American commercial and diplomatic policies are also evaluated by this British specialist in Soviet economics. O.E.S. ■

CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA

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Soviet Union encountered during the two United Nations debates on Afghanistan in 1980, and at the February, 1981, nonaligned meeting at New Delhi. It also hosted the two 1980 meetings of Islamic foreign ministers during which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was condemned. At the same time, Pakistan reportedly toned down the resolution it introduced in the General Assembly in November, 1980, after a stormy meeting between Gromyko and Zia's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, and, in January, 1981, Pakistan indicated that it no longer insisted on a total withdrawal of Soviet troops as a precondition for negotiations with Afghanistan.

EAST ASIA: OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL POWER

The Vietnam War gave the Sino-Vietnamese common front a resilience that enabled it to withstand the increasing strains to which it was subject after 1965. That unity, however tenuous, has been shattered and has been replaced by active hostility. Following the establishment of Communist states in Indochina in 1975, the ancient rivalry between Kampuchea and Vietnam was revived by a border dispute, ideological quarrels, and Vietnam's fear of the growing closeness between the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese. As border clashes increased, Vietnam responded by tilting toward the Soviet Union. Hanoi joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as a full member in June, 1978—China reacted by terminating its economic aid to Vietnam—and signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union in November. Calculating that this would deter the Chinese from intervening, Hanoi responded to increasing Khmer Rouge attacks along the border by invading Kampuchea, quickly toppling the regime of Pol Pot and replacing it with a pliant regime headed by Heng Samrin, a Kampuchean defector.

The Chinese were aware that their regional prestige and credibility would be damaged if they failed to respond to the toppling of a friendly government. They were also aware, however, of the danger of exposing themselves to a Soviet military move from

the north. In a masterly effort to deter the Soviet Union, China launched its carefully limited punitive attack on the Vietnamese in February, 1979, just after Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States. The timing of the attack and Deng's repeated warnings in the United States about Soviet-Vietnamese expansion were clearly designed to create suspicion about Sino-American collusion in Moscow. Thus, Sino-Soviet rivalry spilled over into Indochina and Beijing offset its weakness against the U.S.S.R. by tapping American power. If the United States could play the China card, China could, in turn, play the American card.

The Chinese have adopted a dual strategy in dealing with what they view as a Soviet-supported Vietnamese drive for hegemony in Southeast Asia. They have tried to keep Vietnam off balance and increase the cost that the Kampuchean war imposes on Hanoi. To this end, China has maintained sizable forces along its border with Vietnam and has supplied arms through Thailand to the 30,000 Khmer Rouge guerrillas who are battling the 200,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. It has also armed and stirred up the tribes that straddle its borders with Laos—where 50,000 Vietnamese troops underscore Hanoi's influence—and Vietnam. On the diplomatic front, China has tried to organize regional opposition to the Soviet-Vietnamese partnership, has encouraged both ASEAN and Japan to increase their military capabilities, and discreetly supports a continued American presence in East Asia.

In the case of ASEAN, the Chinese effort has yielded mixed results. Jolted by the events of the past three years, the ASEAN states have significantly increased their defense spending. Member states have held joint military exercises and support has been growing for the standardization of weapons. Nevertheless, the combined armed forces of ASEAN are still smaller than Vietnam's and, given the guerrilla movements that have long existed in most of these states, their military training and operations have focused on counterinsurgency. In contrast, Vietnam's forces are battle-tested and are equipped to wage cross-border conventional war. On the diplomatic front, ASEAN and Beijing have cooperated extensively in the United Nations. They organized support for the November, 1979, and October, 1980, General Assembly resolutions that called on Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, and they thwarted the efforts of Moscow and Hanoi to have Kampuchea's United Nations seat, now held by the Khmer Rouge, transferred to the Heng Samrin government.

Nevertheless, while there are indeed differences between individual ASEAN states on the Kampuchean issue, these are less significant than the differences between China and ASEAN. ASEAN is keenly aware that, because of the Khmer Rouge's brutal rule in Kampuchea (from 1975 to November,

1978), many countries are reluctant to support the Pol Pot forces enthusiastically as the alternative to Heng Samrin. Consequently, ASEAN has supported the concept of a coalition headed by non-Communists like Prince Norodom Sihanouk or his former Prime Minister, Son Sann, and a reduction in the importance in the Khmer Rouge of such top leaders as Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot, and Ieng Sary.

These proposals were put to the Chinese during visits to Beijing by Thailand's Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulonond, and Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew. China's lack of great enthusiasm for the idea stems from two considerations. First, given Beijing's strong and established ties to the Khmer Rouge, it would prefer to have them govern Kampuchea if the Heng Samrin regime is unseated. This would fit in better with China's strategy of balancing Soviet and Vietnamese power in Southeast Asia. Second, and this calculation is publicly stated, China is convinced that only effective and continued military pressure will, by increasing Vietnam's burdens, cause it to withdraw from Kampuchea. The Chinese believe that only the experienced and battle-hardened troops of the Khmer Rouge are capable of mounting an effective military operation against Vietnam. While the Chinese subsequently moderated their position on a non-Communist-led united front, progress toward the goal has been limited. Son Sann has indicated a willingness to join but Sihanouk, who strongly opposes the Khmer Rouge, has continued to waver. (He decided to lead the coalition in February, 1981, but subsequently indicated a lack of real commitment and an intent to pursue protracted negotiations with the Khmer Rouge.)

In view of the support that China has long given to Communist insurgencies in Malaysia and Thailand, and the break in Sino-Indonesian relations after the attempted coup by the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) in 1965, the ASEAN states are wary of overly close ties with China. In return for Thailand's willingness to allow China to supply the Khmer Rouge guerrillas through Thai territory, Beijing has reportedly ended its support for the Communist party of Thailand. Deng Xiaoping is also said to have told the Prime Ministers of Singapore and Thailand during their visits to China that support for regional insurgencies was a past policy that would be phased out. In ASEAN, however, there are fears that this may be a temporary ploy and that the return to power of the Khmer Rouge would bring about a dangerous extension of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.

There is also some concern within ASEAN that the Chinese strategy of maintaining steady and multifaceted pressure on Vietnam, instead of forcing Hanoi to withdraw from Kampuchea, will cement Vietnam's ties with the Soviet Union. Indonesia, for example,

believes that a greater sensitivity to Vietnam's security concerns in Kampuchea and to Vietnam's fear of China will increase its confidence and will gradually encourage Vietnam to seek greater autonomy from the U.S.S.R. This willingness to be responsive to Vietnamese concerns was evident at the June, 1981, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Manila, where an unsuccessful effort was made to obtain Vietnamese participation at the July international conference on Kampuchea by assuring Hanoi that the purpose of the conference was not to put Vietnam in the dock. ASEAN's proposal at the Manila meeting for a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the disarming of all sides, the introduction of United Nations peacekeeping forces, and the holding of elections in which the Heng Samrin regime could participate is indicative of ASEAN's desire to propose a settlement acceptable to Vietnam.

For Moscow, supporting Vietnam has come to be a costly affair, involving the direct and indirect transfer of resources amounting to \$2 million a day.²³ While Soviet leaders have benefited strategically from access to Vietnam's airfields and ports, they have also increased the persuasiveness of China's warnings to ASEAN and Japan about Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism. Furthermore, the growing cooperation between Washington and Beijing has been fueled in good measure by a common intent to halt what is viewed as a predatory alliance between Hanoi and Moscow.

For Hanoi, because of the fear of China and the United States effort to deny Vietnam Western sources of aid, there are few incentives to reassess its relationship with the Soviet Union, and several reasons not to do so. To cope with Chinese pressure, the deterrent value of the Moscow connection continues to be important, as is the supply of Soviet arms. Because of Vietnam's severe food shortages, a sluggish economy, and a shortage of convertible currency with which to trade with the West, the Soviet Union remains the key source of aid.

Nevertheless, the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship is less than blissful. Moscow has been impatient with Vietnam's slow progress in snuffing out the Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Soviet unwillingness to continue providing subsidized oil and the gap that has emerged between Vietnamese expectations concerning Soviet aid (especially for its 1981-1985 third five year plan) and the Soviet inability to meet them have also created discord. Aware of their heavy dependence on the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese remain sensitive to encroachments on their independence. The activities of Soviet personnel are closely monitored, and Hanoi restricts Soviet access to its air and naval facilities.

As part of their strategy of coalescing regional power against Vietnam and the Soviet Union, the Chinese have steadily increased their ties with Japan.

²³IHS, *Strategic Survey* 1979, p. 60.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1972, and China's trade with Japan has grown much more rapidly than Soviet-Japanese trade in recent years. On the security front, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in August, 1978, which contained an antihegemony clause that the Soviet Union views as a hostile reference. China has also abandoned its past policy of warning against the revival of Japanese militarism; instead, it supports an expanded Japanese defense effort and regularly points out that the growth in Soviet power bodes ill for Japan's security.

In Japan, a defense debate has developed which, in terms of its openness, is unprecedented in Japan's postwar history. Although its origins and the effect it will have on Japan's military capabilities cannot be discussed here,²⁴ it is clear that apprehension about the growth of Soviet power and the adequacy of the American security guarantee is central to the debate. The debate has caused Soviet leaders to perceive a Sino-American campaign to stimulate a growth in Japanese military might and has ended the period in which Japanese advocates of stepped up defense spending were consigned to the small lunatic fringe.

Despite their concern over the future of Japan's military policy, Soviet leaders have not gone to great lengths to be flexible on major Soviet-Japanese differences. While repeatedly calling for a bilateral friendship treaty and exhibiting much interest in harnessing Japanese credits and technology to the development of Siberia's resources, Moscow has been intractable on specific issues that limit the progress of Soviet-Japanese relations. For example, the Japanese claim to the Northern Islands, occupied by the U.S.S.R. following World War II, has been curtly rejected with the Soviet statement that

[t]he Soviet Union has long since given the Japanese government a thorough explanation of why Japan's claims on the Kurile islands chain, which is U.S.S.R. territory, are groundless. There is no territorial question between our countries.²⁵

Instead, in the last two years, military deployments have been increased both on the Soviet mainland adjacent to Japan and on the Kuriles. Moscow's intransigence over the Kuriles derives from a fear that, in view of other territorial gains it made following World War II, it might open a Pandora's box by making concessions to the Japanese. The islands also guard the Sea of Okhotsk, which could provide a sheltered launching zone for the most modern Soviet submarines. Whatever the Soviet Union's motives, the

²⁴Details in Wolf Mendl, "The Security Debate in Japan," *International Affairs* (London), vol. 56, no. 4 (autumn, 1980), pp. 607-621; and Gerald L. Curtis, "Japanese Security Policies," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 4 (spring, 1981), pp. 852-874.

²⁵CDSP, vol. 31, no. 7 (March 14, 1979), p. 17.

Northern Islands issue, together with the greater concern over Soviet power, gives Japanese advocates of greater military power and Beijing an issue, and inhibits the formation in Japan of a consensus favoring closer ties with the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSION

In Asia, China competes with the Soviet Union from a position of weakness and its diplomatic efforts to summon the potential power of ASEAN and Japan will not rectify the imbalance in the short term. China's awareness of this is what makes its emerging partnership with the United States so vital. The prospects for the durability of this partnership are good. The Chinese are conscious of their military disparity along the Sino-Soviet border and, given the importance of Siberia for the Soviet economy, they anticipate that Soviet activity east of the Urals will increase. For the United States, China has come to signify a vast and luring market, a center of great potential power toward which sizable Soviet resources must be diverted, and an Asian state willing to play a key role in the region's balance of power.

For the Soviet Union, competition in Asia is enormously costly. The uncertain Afghan campaign and deployments along the Sino-Soviet border together tie down roughly 600,000 Soviet troops, while support for the embattled Afghan regime and for Vietnam's suzerainty over Indochina are expensive commitments. It is difficult to identify the many immediate benefits that Soviet leaders have acquired in Asia; but they have set in motion worrisome trends. ASEAN is nervously groping toward greater unity and military strength and is looking to the United States and China for support. In Japan, apprehension about Soviet power has provided one of the major stimuli for a defense debate that is watched with anxiety by the Kremlin. A similar concern about Soviet power has created a Sino-American partnership that threatens to actualize China's vast potential. As they contemplate the implications of this development, the Soviet leaders must worry about Deng Xiaoping's remark:

It's common sense that if China dares to stand up to the Soviet Union even if it's poor . . . why should China seek reconciliation with the Soviet Union after it gets rich[?]

SOVIET POLICIES IN EAST EUROPE

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have acted with the greatest degree of independence, although they are careful to stress their cooperation and close ties with the Soviet Union (especially on the anniversary of the friendship treaty with that country). Recent events in Poland have apparently triggered a shift from industrialization as the first priority to food production. Procurement prices were raised by

12 percent, and agriculture will receive more investment for large-scale irrigation projects as well as for erosion control, drainage and land reclamation. These measures were taken as a result of strikes and demonstrations against food shortages.

Yugoslavia holds associate membership in CMEA and has never joined the Warsaw Pact. After the death of President Josip Broz Tito in May, 1980, there were speculations concerning a possible Soviet attempt to bring Yugoslavia into the bloc. This has not yet happened. Despite an official 30 percent (unofficially 40 percent) inflation rate, the country seems to be stable. Stane Dolanc, a member of the ruling party's Presidium, has complained about the price of Soviet natural gas, which costs him personally the equivalent of \$230 per month to heat his 134-square-meter apartment.¹⁶

There seems to be no apprehension in Yugoslavia about criticizing the U.S.S.R. Janez Stanic, a journalist from Slovenia, who was stationed in Moscow between 1964 and 1976, recently published a book describing pervasive Soviet censorship, which results in misinformation about the outside world and about domestic conditions. The author states that non-Russian nationalities are subjected to "Russian hegemony." Eurocommunism, anathema to Moscow, is also publicized in Yugoslavia through interviews with West European Communist leaders like Giancarlo Pajetta, of the Italian Communist party.

Only Albania, the smallest of the East European regimes, is completely hostile toward the U.S.S.R. This hostility could be felt at a two-day session on the struggle against Soviet "revisionism" over the preceding 20 years. Each year, the media in Moscow publish an article commemorating the 1945 establishment of diplomatic relations with Tirana. However, it is doubtful that diplomatic relations between Albania and the Soviet Union will be resumed while the present Albanian leadership remains in power.

THE BOTTOM LINE

As mentioned above, the Polish United Workers' party did hold its ninth extraordinary congress in mid-July, 1981. The outcome of these deliberations will have a profound effect not only on Poland itself but also on the relationship between the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. If the new leadership in Warsaw remains prudent enough in its future decisions, the U.S.S.R. will have no justification to intervene. However, should the "socialist renewal" process get out of hand and develop beyond acceptable limits, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to invade.

¹⁶ *Nedeljne Informative Novine* (Belgrade), January 18, 1981.

¹⁷ M.A. Luderius, "Détente and Foreign Military Presence in Europe," pp. 9-11 of an unpublished paper. The author, a citizen of Sweden, has been employed with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

It is significant that Soviet military deployments in East Europe (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland) have increased over the past several years in areas, numbers of sites, logistics and infrastructure, troop strength, as well as in the amount and modernity of weapons' systems. In contrast, indigenous armed forces in these allied countries have been dispersed so that none are stationed adjacent to U.S.S.R. borders. Their equipment is obsolete, and some armed forces have decreased in number, in Czechoslovakia, for example.¹⁷

Meanwhile, Soviet deployments have reportedly been strengthened vis-à-vis the southern and northern flanks, i.e., Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and Hungary facing Austria and Yugoslavia; those in East Germany, Poland and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) directed toward Sweden and Finland. If this assessment is accurate, it would imply a fundamental change in the perceived function of Soviet troops throughout East Europe.

Kremlin decision-makers are apparently not worried, despite their propaganda to the contrary, about a NATO attack. They are concerned more with extending their influence, perhaps with the threat of military power as an instrument of foreign policy, into the four neutral countries located on Warsaw Treaty Organization flanks.

The politburocrats in Moscow apparently intend to maintain their East European empire at any cost, even if this means applying force. In a time when colonialism has all but disappeared from the face of the earth, the Soviet Union gives every indication that it will continue to pursue anachronistic imperial policies. In the long run, these policies may well result in an explosion that will in turn affect the Soviet Union itself. ■

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

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deployments could continue in NATO. One can only speculate on the impact in NATO had Brezhnev offered to halt the buildup of SS-20's in October, 1979. Given the hesitation and reluctance in Europe, he probably could have significantly affected NATO's decisions. Indeed, Soviet consternation about NATO's decisions fails to ring true; for over two years the Soviet Union could have broached the question of theater weapons bilaterally to the United States, to NATO, to Germany, or even in SALT. The failure to do so and the subsequent acceleration of the SS-20 deployment strongly suggest that the Soviet Union is determined to have a major missile force targeted against Europe in any case.

Nevertheless, the Soviet diplomatic campaign began to pay off. It had the effect of generating major political pressures in Europe against any new nuclear

deployments, feeding pacifist and neutralist sentiment, especially in Germany and the low countries. At the NATO meeting in May the new American administration reconfirmed the dual-track NATO decision of negotiations and deployments, and by July the administration was proposing another round of talks to begin before the end of 1981. This, of course, implied that the SALT II provisions would not be killed in the interim; so the Soviets had succeeded in a salvage operation, mainly by exploiting European apprehensions over a new cold war.

THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS

If the Soviet Union enjoyed temporary success in returning arms control issues to the center of United States-Soviet relations, it still had to deal with the Reagan administration's insistence that such issues had to be linked to the broader question of Soviet conduct, especially in the third world. Well before the Reagan administration took office, the Soviet Union had mounted a counteroffensive against the condemnation of its invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet leaders took the simple and disarming position that they were willing to negotiate about the withdrawal of Soviet troops once the "causes" for the original intervention were removed, i.e., no outside interference. This was patently unacceptable as a serious basis for any negotiation, so the Soviet Union gradually constructed a more elaborate context for discussing Afghanistan: either as a separate issue, focusing on superpower guarantees for the Afghan regime, or as part of a broader settlement of Persian Gulf issues, including removal of United States naval and air forces from the general area (as foreshadowed in Brezhnev's visit to India in December and his proposal to demilitarize the Indian Ocean).

Soviet leaders saw the issue as one for the two superpowers; but while the "international aspects" of the Afghan question could be discussed, Afghanistan's internal affairs could not. In other words, the acceptance of the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal was the entry price to any serious negotiations. When British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington tested this position in conversations in Moscow in early July, he found little if any flexibility in the Soviet insistence that the Karmal regime had to be recognized as the starting point, and had to be involved in the actual negotiations. This, of course, was unacceptable to the West. A long-term Soviet occupation of Afghanistan seemed more and more certain.

Despite its rigidity on Afghanistan, Soviet leaders saw that they would confront repeated demands to discuss their conduct in general, and that the Reagan administration would be tempted to make the issue of linkage a precondition to negotiations. The Soviet

Union, of course, rejects "linkage" of issues Western style, but in practice the Soviets are masters of linking issues. Soviet leaders countered the potential linkage issues in a Brezhnev speech of April 27, proposing that the United States and the Soviet Union arrive at an agreement on a new "code of rules of conduct" that would include five principles:¹¹ (1) noninterference in internal affairs, (2) respect for territorial integrity, (3) recognition of the rights of each African, Asian and Latin American state to "equal participation" in international life, (4) recognition of the sovereignty of these states over their natural resources and (5) respect for nonalignment.

At first glance, the new Soviet principles, though a familiar Soviet device, seemed to be an offer to negotiate a settlement of the third world conflict that had damaged United States-Soviet relations in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and other states. It also seemed responsive to the Reagan-Haig interest in a code of restraint. But on examination of the Soviet interpretation, strong doubts emerged. The Soviet Union claimed the five principles meant: (1) the abandonment of any interference in Afghanistan, (2) return of the "Arab lands" taken by Israel, (3) an end to threats against Cuba, (4) the elimination of a Western presence in the Persian Gulf, and (5) renunciation of the policy of "cobbled together military establishments" and bases at the expense of the sovereignty of developing countries. In short, the Soviet Union suggested that the United States respect the status quo, withdraw its military forces from the Gulf area, and permit the continuation of Soviet support for "liberation" movements.

Despite the patently one-sided interpretations offered by Moscow, the fact of the proposal, i.e., the willingness to begin a dialogue on a code of conduct in the third world, was a bow toward the American position. To be sure, it was a mechanism designed to deflect any serious negotiations, but it reflected a recognition that any relationship with the United States would have to take into account the incompatibility of pursuing détente in arms control talks and in Europe, and an aggressive, exploitative Soviet offensive elsewhere. The Reagan administration had reestablished linkage as a principle of superpower relations, and the Soviet leaders were grudgingly acknowledging this new fact of international political life while trying to rob it of lasting significance. The issue remained at the top of the new Soviet-American agenda.

THE NEW UNCERTAINTIES

In addition to the more traditional security and geopolitical issues that affect United States-Soviet relations, newer uncertainties seem likely to play a greater role in the 1980's.

First, of course, is the Polish crisis. Both the Carter

¹¹SWO, May 15, 1981.

and Reagan administrations made it clear that Soviet military intervention would have the most serious consequences for United States-Soviet relations and for international politics as a whole. Soviet leaders are realistic enough to recognize this as a potent factor. While they might think that European fears of war would soon force a return to a pre-invasion normality, Americans would view the situation differently. There is a large Polish-American population in the United States; and Poland as the initial victim of World War II enjoys considerable emotional support in the United States and Europe. And finally, Soviet intervention in Poland would be the first major challenge to a new American administration that has a strong anti-Communist record.

These reasons, of course, would not override the Soviet Union's vital interest in preserving its empire in East Europe and containing the infection of free institutions that is developing in Poland. But Soviet leaders have been hesitant if not divided. Thus the Polish crisis casts a long shadow over East-West relations and relations between Washington and Moscow. Soviet intervention could poison the prospects for any improvement.

Assuming, however, that the Polish crisis is handled without military force (a debatable assumption), a second major uncertainty flows from a change in Soviet leadership, which could well occur during President Reagan's incumbency.

As time passes and the Soviet succession decision is postponed or deferred, it seems likely that maintaining continuity will be increasingly difficult. Had Brezhnev stepped aside in the last two years, the governing coalition of elders—Mikhail Suslov, Andrei Kirilenko, Andrei Gromyko, Dimitri Ustinov, Yuri Andropov—would probably have managed to maintain Brezhnevism without Brezhnev. But this may be more and more difficult; some of this group will leave for various reasons; the Politburo will gradually need new blood. The unique confirmation of the entire Politburo and candidates without change at the party congress underlines the leadership's reluctance to initiate the painful and uncertain process of changing leaders and generations.

Whatever the outcome of the succession, the Soviet Union's foreign policy must work with a third uncertainty: the increasingly intractable economic situation. The Polish crisis shows that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely. But inside the Soviet Union the process of economic reform can never be divorced from politics. If Soviet leaders are determined to avoid economic reform and experimen-

tation in order to overcome the looming crisis of slow growth and declining productivity, then they will be increasingly under pressure to turn to Europe, the United States and Japan for economic support, credits, trade and technology.

This suggests a more conciliatory foreign policy. And if this is unacceptable, then a new leadership will have to contemplate the consequences of a period of economic stringencies that might even weaken the Soviet defense effort.¹² Foreseeing this Soviet crisis some observers fear that Soviet leaders will be tempted to embark on a foreign adventure, taking advantage of what may be an optimal period of Soviet military power. This danger cannot be discounted.

Soviet fears may be aggravated by the continuing rapprochement between China and the United States, which may soon include some form of military cooperation. This was almost certainly anticipated in Moscow some time ago, when the American Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his Chinese counterpart exchanged visits.¹³ And the Reagan administration's confirmation of this general policy (after speculation that Sino-American relations might decline over the Taiwan issue) solidified Soviet fears that what the Soviet Union is facing in the 1980's is encirclement: a new alliance comprised of the United States, China, Japan and West Europe.

This dangerous prospect for the Soviet leadership constitutes the main strategic problem facing the U.S.S.R.: how to break up this coalition of the world's great powers. Thus far the Soviet strategy has been to offer a continuing détente to Europe, hoping to inhibit European collaboration with such a coalition and to keep the door slightly ajar for China. While not abandoning this tactic, Moscow must also soberly consider how to deal with an American administration that has placed Soviet-American relations at the heart of its foreign policy, but which seems determined to approach these relations from a "position of strength."

How Soviet leaders intend to respond is not at all clear. A new strategic confidence has been growing incrementally over the past 15 years in the Soviet Union; beginning with the Angola intervention, a far more assertive Soviet behavior developed in the late 1970's. This reflects not merely Soviet judgment about technical facts, i.e., missile warheads, but a new calculation about the general "correlation of forces," evident in both theoretical pronouncements and in Soviet conduct.

Yet if Soviet leaders calculate on the basis of a broad correlation of forces and not simply on a narrow ratio of weapons, they cannot ignore the geopolitical problems on their frontiers—in Poland and Afghanistan and China. They face situations that have high political costs, involve long-term political-military and economic burdens, and threaten the security of their

¹²See the discussion by Myron Rush, "The Soviet Military Buildup and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay," *International Security*, Spring, 1981, p. 169.

¹³See Zbigniew Brzezinski interview with Takashi Oka in *Christian Science Monitor*, July 20, 1981, p. 3.

supply lines and flanks. And they raise a challenge to their recently acquired strategic confidence. A superpower bogged down in efforts to shore up its immediate weakness and driven by fears of encirclement may be entering a period of decline.

This latter judgment requires a careful examination. It has become a ritual in the West to say that the Soviet system offers no ideological attraction, is politically and economically weak and therefore relies on military power. This is true, but it is misleading. Soviet weaknesses have not yet been demonstrated in any historically valid sense. The Soviet economy is an enormously strong machine, capable of providing for its needs and therefore far less vulnerable to international currents than its Western counterparts.

Ideologically, the Soviet system lost its appeal long ago. None of the developing countries have been attracted by the Soviet model, but many have been intrigued with the Leninist system of building political power and authority. Finally, it has been the patronage of a great power rather than Soviet ideology that has attracted Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and others.

The importance of Soviet military power remains, and not because all else has failed.¹⁴ It is important precisely because the Soviet leaders believe that military power is decisive in international affairs and is the prerequisite for advancing political goals. Major turning points in Soviet history have been reached by military means: the civil war, the German invasion, the Hungarian uprising, and the Prague spring. In confronting the United States in an era of American nuclear monopoly, Stalin maintained huge conventional forces. In an era of United States missile preponderance, Nikita Khrushchev countered with large medium-range missile forces in Europe. In the era of strategic competition, Soviet leaders have demonstrated a determination to build massive forces, at least equal to their opponents and enemies. The Red Army saved the Soviet Union from the brink of extinction 40 years ago, and it remains the means to global power. There is little reason for the next generation of Soviet leaders to regard military strength differently. This is a central issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two superpowers begin the process of determining a new relationship for the decade of the 1980's. ■

¹⁴See especially Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 264.

THE SOVIET-CUBAN CONNECTION

(Continued from page 335)

join the rebels. Perhaps as a result of that failure, the Soviet hand has not been clearly seen in the Salvadoran conflict. But only 200 miles away, in

Managua, Soviet Aeroflot planes are landing almost daily, and neither Moscow nor Havana has given up on El Salvador.

A HEAVY PRICE

Whatever the value of Cuba to the Soviet Union as an instrument or partner in its global strategy, the Castro government has been able to extract a heavy price for its "international solidarity." For years, only massive Soviet assistance has kept the Cuban economy from collapsing. Ten years ago, when Soviet assistance was estimated at \$1 million a day, the figure was thought to be exaggerated. Today, Soviet aid is believed to be over \$10 million a day (military equipment excluded) and few observers doubt the statistic. Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union is said to total well over \$25 billion, which Moscow does not have the slightest hope of collecting.

Cuban-Soviet trade exchanges are simple. Cuba sends sugar, nickel and fruit to the Soviet Union, and receives in return every product a modern country requires for a modest subsistence. Moscow pays preferential prices for Cuban sugar, which accounts for over 80 percent of all Cuban exports, but this is merely a ledger adjustment that keeps the Cuban indebtedness from rising even higher.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CUBAN SOCIETY

Despite more than 20 years of close official relations, the Soviet Union and its citizens have made surprisingly few impressions on Cuban society. In Cuba, the Russians live in segregated compounds, do not fraternize, and regard their tour of duty as an extended tropical vacation. The Cubans view the Russians mainly as providers of economic assistance and have become accustomed to Soviet aid, which they take for granted as a payment for Cuba's "internationalist duties." This attitude, reportedly shared by the population and government leaders, leads most Cubans to regard hard, steady work, which the island's economy badly needs, as unnecessary if not foolish.

There was a time in the 1960's when Cuban leaders feared that they might be regarded by the Kremlin as expendable. Castro's 1968 acceptance of the policy-setting role of the Soviet leadership dissipated these fears somewhat. As long as Cuba openly and fully supports the Soviet Union, Cuba's leaders do not have to be overly concerned about being abandoned by their Russian "brothers." But some observers who know the Soviet "modus operandi" believe that on occasion the Cubans are reminded that, when all is said and done, the loss of Cuba would only be a minor embarrassment to the Soviet Union, and maybe not even that. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of August, 1981, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Lebanon in Crisis

- Aug. 13—The Lebanese government accepts "in principle" a Libyan offer to provide Lebanon with an air defense system, including missiles, to counter Israeli air strikes.
- Aug. 27—in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin says Palestinians have deployed 18 Soviet-made artillery pieces in Lebanon since the July 24 cease-fire; he says Israel will take no action against them as long as they remain inactive.

Middle East

- Aug. 3—with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. signing as an observer, representatives of Egypt and Israel sign an agreement for a 2,500-member international peacekeeping force in the Sinai; the U.S. will furnish about half the force.
- Aug. 8—Speaking in Washington, D.C., Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asks all nations to urge Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to negotiate and "to settle their problems without shooting out their grievances."

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd outlines a 7-point peace plan for the Middle East, urging the U.S. to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization and calling for "recognition of the right of all states in the region to live in peace," a tacit recognition of Israel's right to exist. Fahd urges Israel to withdraw from occupied territory and to recognize the rights of the Palestinians, and to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

- Aug. 9—Israel rejects the Saudi peace proposals.
- Aug. 26—in Alexandria, Egypt, President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin conclude 2 days of talks; they agree to resume negotiations on self-rule for the Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

- Aug. 26—Meeting in Nairobi, a 7-nation committee of the OAU proposes that a cease-fire be followed by a referendum in the Western Sahara to resolve the issues between Morocco and Mauritania.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

- Aug. 21—the 13 member states of OPEC, meeting for 3 days in Geneva, fail to reach agreement on a new, lower range of oil prices.

Saudi oil minister Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani announces that Saudi Arabia will reduce its oil production for September from 10 million barrels a day to 9 mbd; it will continue to sell its oil for \$32 a barrel.

- Aug. 26—the Nigerian government reduces its oil price by \$4 a barrel to \$36 per barrel.

United Nations

(See also *Angola*)

- Aug. 3—the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference

resumes discussions in Geneva; some 150 nations have been working since 1973 to produce a treaty on global rules for the use of the oceans.

- Aug. 21—in Nairobi, a 12-day U.N. conference on new and renewable energy sources ends; the delegates from 125 countries establish a U.N. committee to administer a \$1-billion program to end dependence on fossil fuels; the conference fails to provide funding.

- Aug. 24—the Law of the Sea Conference postpones action on a proposed treaty until next year in order to give the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan adequate time to formulate its position.

- Aug. 28—the Law of the Sea Conference adjourns.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

- Aug. 19—it is reported that the Soviet-backed government of Babrak Karmal has rescinded its unpopular land redistribution program and will permit some landholders to retain unlimited acreage.

ANGOLA

(See also *South Africa; U.S.; Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 25—Angop, the Angolan press agency, reports that 2 South African armored columns including 32 tanks and 82 other vehicles crossed into Angola from Namibia in pursuit of South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas and have pushed 60 miles into the interior of Angola.

- Aug. 26—in Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer deplores the South African raid into Angola, but he says the raid must "be understood in its full context." Britain, France and West Germany ask for the immediate withdrawal of South African troops.

- Aug. 27—an Angolan Defense Ministry spokesman reports that South African forces have destroyed Xangongo, a town 60 miles inside the Angolan border, and that South African planes have bombed Cahama, a town about 120 miles inside the border.

- Aug. 28—South African Defense Forces leader General Constand Viljoen says that South African troops have begun to withdraw from Angola; he denies Angolan reports that 45,000 South African troops have been involved in the operation.

The U.N. Security Council holds an emergency session on the situation in Angola.

- Aug. 29—South African military officials claim South African forces destroyed an Angolan rebel radar installation and killed at least 240 Angolan soldiers in their invasion of Angola.

- Aug. 31—in the Security Council, the U.S. vetoes a resolution condemning South Africa's raid into Angola; France approves the resolution and Great Britain abstains.

BOLIVIA

- Aug. 4—General Luis García Meza resigns from the presidency after a military uprising forces him out.

- Aug. 5—a 3-man military junta takes charge; the junta is

headed by Air Force General Waldo Bernal Pereira and includes army commander General Celso Torrelío Villa and navy commander Admiral Oscar Pammo.

Aug. 6—Army rebels controlling Santa Cruz refuse to acknowledge the junta; the rebel units are headed by army General Alberto Natusch Busch and former army chief of staff General Lucio Añez Rivero.

Aug. 8—The junta reaches an agreement with the rebels; rebel troops return to their barracks.

BRAZIL

Aug. 5—in the 21st adjustment in 1981, the Central Bank of Brazil devalues the cruzeiro; the accumulated devaluation since January 1 comes to 51.327 percent.

Aug. 7—General Golbery do Couto e Silva resigns as head of the civilian Cabinet.

Aug. 12—João Leitao De Abreu, appointed by President João Baptista Figueiredo to succeed General Golbery as head of the Cabinet, assumes office.

BURMA

Aug. 8—in his closing address to the ruling Burma Socialist Program party's 4th congress, General Ne Win announces that he will resign as President in November; he will continue to hold the post of party chairman, to which he was reelected yesterday.

CANADA

(See also U.S., Administration)

Aug. 11—Members of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers accept a 2-year contract and return to work after a 6-week postal strike.

Aug. 17—International mail service is resumed.

External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan says that Canada is willing to sell China "some kinds of strategic goods."

Aug. 18—A government-appointed commission recommends legislation to curb the "monstrous" concentration of the nation's newspapers by several major newspaper chains.

CHILE

Aug. 11—President Augusto Pinochet's government exiles Jaime Castillo, president of Chile's Human Rights Commission, and 3 other opposition leaders.

CHINA

(See also Canada; Malaysia)

Aug. 25—in Beijing, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter meets with Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang; Carter is on a 10-day private visit.

Aug. 27—in Beijing, former President Carter says that 3 years ago he and Deputy Chairman Deng Xiaoping agreed that the U.S. would continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan.

CUBA

Aug. 8—President Fidel Castro ends a 26-hour meeting with Mexican President José López Portillo.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Aug. 2—After some 2 weeks in the Soviet Union that included a meeting with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, party leader Gustav Husak returns to Czechoslovakia.

EGYPT

(See also Intl. Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy)

Aug. 12—it is reported in Washington, D.C., that Presi-

dent Sadat has asked the U.S. for between 100 and 150 additional F-16 fighter planes and other military equipment.

EL SALVADOR

Aug. 7—in its Costa Rican office, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Hector Meton says that 305,000 refugees have fled from El Salvador in the last year.

Aug. 12—the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America says that "last week" the Salvadoran army killed 96 unarmed civilians, including 46 children, at a guerrilla base near San Salvador; an army spokesman denies the charge.

Aug. 20—Salvadoran army officials report that the army has retaken the town of Perquín in the northeastern province of Morazán.

Aug. 28—in response to a joint Mexican-French letter to the U.N. Security Council acknowledging the rebels in El Salvador as a "representative political force," U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. accuses the rebels of practicing "straight terrorism"; he charges Cuba and the Soviet Union with providing arms to the rebels.

FRANCE

(See also El Salvador; Iran)

Aug. 5—After demonstrations in Teheran protesting France's granting of political asylum to former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the French government advises all French citizens in Iran to "return quickly."

Aug. 25—the government offers a record interest rate of 16.75 percent on government borrowing.

GAMBIA

Aug. 2—President Dawda Kairaba Jawara returns to Banjul from Senegal after urging the rebels to free their hostages and surrender.

Aug. 6—Senegalese troops free more than 100 hostages, including 4 of Jawara's children; 1 of his 2 wives and his 4 other children were freed yesterday.

Aug. 21—President Dawda and Senegalese President Abdou Diouf announce their decision to join the 2 countries in a confederation.

GERMANY, WEST

(See also U.S., Military)

Aug. 24—Chancellor Helmut Schmidt says that "under certain conditions" the neutron warhead to be produced by the U.S. may be stationed on West German soil; his conditions are that the weapon be stationed in other European countries as well, that the stationing be based on a joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision, and that arms control negotiations must have failed.

Aug. 31—in Ramstein, a bomb explodes at the European headquarters of the U.S. Air Force, injuring 20 people.

HAITI

Aug. 26—Opposition Social Democratic party leader Sylvio Claude, his daughter and 20 of his supporters are sentenced to 15-year jail terms for opposing the government of President Jean-Claude Duvalier.

INDIA

Aug. 5—the Indian Space Research Organization says that after a successful year in orbit its first space satellite, Rohini 1, has reentered earth's atmosphere and burned up.

IRAN(See also *France; Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 1—The Cabinet resigns so that President Mohammed Ali Rajai can select a new Cabinet.
- Aug. 2—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini confirms Rajai as President.
- Aug. 4—Rajai names Mohammed Javad Bahonar as Prime Minister.
- Aug. 5—The U.N. reveals that it has revised downward its estimate of the death toll from the July earthquake in southeastern Iran; the new estimate is that 1,500 people died.
- Aug. 6—Iran refuses to allow French nationals to leave the country because France refuses to extradite former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who fled from Iran last week.
- Aug. 10—French nationals are allowed to leave Iran.
- Aug. 14—Iranian monarchists claim credit for yesterday's seizure of the navy's gunboat *Tabarzin*, which was sailing to Iran from France.
- Aug. 17—The Parliament endorses 21 Cabinet members; 1 is rejected.
- 23 more leftists are reported executed.
- Aug. 19—in Marseilles, the Iranian hijackers agree to turn the *Tabarzin* over to French authorities; the French government agrees to guarantee their security.
- Aug. 25—Iranian embassies in Brussels and the Hague are occupied by Iranian students protesting the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini; police arrest the students and clear the embassies in the two cities.
- Aug. 26—26 more left-wing opponents of the government are executed.
- Aug. 30—Pars, the official press agency, reports that a bomb has exploded in Prime Minister Bahonar's office, killing Bahonar and President Rajai; 15 others are injured.
- Aug. 31—Funeral services are held for the slain leaders.

The Guardian Council approves Speaker of Parliament Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani and Chief Justice Ayatollah Abdulkarim Mussavi Ardabeli as heads of an interim government until elections are held.

ISRAEL(See also *Intl. Lebanon in Crisis; Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Aug. 4—Prime Minister Menachem Begin says he has formed a new coalition Cabinet after making major concessions to 3 minority religious parties; General Ariel Sharon is to be the Minister of Defense.
- Aug. 5—in a vote of confidence, Begin's coalition wins the 61 votes he needs in the 120-member Knesset. The conservative Agudat party wins major concessions in exchange for its support.
- Aug. 19—Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazim Shlomo Goren and Chief Rabbi of the Sephardim Ovadia Yosef rule that excavation of the biblical city of King David near the Old City of Jerusalem violates Jewish law because it desecrates graves.
- Aug. 21—Former officials in the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter reveal that Israel secretly sold Iran 250 spare tires, worth \$300,000, for U.S.-built F-4 fighter bombers in October, 1980, during the Iran-Iraq war; Israel reportedly delayed shipment at the request of the U.S. government during the hostage crisis.
- Aug. 25—3 U.S. F-15 fighter planes are delivered to Israel as U.S. military aid is resumed.

JAPAN

Aug. 26—Because of the fruit fly infestation of produce in California, the Japanese government rules that all produce coming from California must be fumigated; in addition, all produce shipped through California must have pest-free certification. Japan is the largest foreign purchaser of California produce.

KOREA, NORTH

- Aug. 26—in Washington, D.C., Pentagon officials report that a North Korean surface-to-air missile was fired at a U.S.-manned reconnaissance plane, an SR-71, near the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea; the missile missed the plane and the plane landed safely.
- Aug. 27—U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer expresses "serious concern" over the missile firing yesterday and says the U.S. will take "whatever steps are necessary to assure the future safety of our pilots and planes."

Aug. 28—the government press agency denies charges that government forces fired a missile at a U.S. reconnaissance plane flying in South Korean and international airspace; the press agency charges that the plane violated "the territorial air of the northern half of our republic."

LEBANON(See *Intl. Lebanon in Crisis*)**LIBERIA**

Aug. 14—Major General Thomas Weh Syen, deputy head of the government until his ouster last week, is executed for participating in an assassination plot against head of state Samuel K. Doe; 4 former members of the ruling People's Redemption Council are also executed.

Aug. 26—the International Monetary Fund approves a \$69-million loan to help the economy.

LIBYA(See also *Intl. Lebanon in Crisis; Somalia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 19—in Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reports that 2 U.S. navy F-14 aircraft were attacked by 2 Soviet-built Libyan SU-22 fighter planes in international airspace over international waters in the Mediterranean; the Libyan jets are shot down by the U.S. planes, which are stationed on the U.S. aircraft carrier *Nimitz*.

The U.S. sends an official protest to the Libyan government via the Belgian embassy in Tripoli.

In a protest note to the U.S. government, Libya accuses the U.S. of violating Libyan territorial waters over the Gulf of Sidra; the government claims its jets shot down a U.S. plane.

Aug. 20—U.S. President Reagan defends the action of the U.S. planes and says the U.S. will continue its policy of prompt retaliatory action to make U.S. power "impressive to the enemies of freedom." Although the U.S. maneuvers were not intended to provoke an incident, President Reagan says, "We decided it was time to recognize what are the international waters and behave accordingly." Under President Carter, U.S. planes were prohibited from flying over the Gulf of Sidra, which Libya claims as part of its territorial waters.

Aug. 21—in his first public response to the air battle with U.S. planes, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi acknowledges that 2 Libyan planes were downed; he continues to insist that a U.S. plane was also shot down.

Aug. 24—Vice Admiral William H. Rowden, commander

of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, says that in the last week U.S. fighter planes from the *Nimitz* intercepted Libyan aircraft on 45 different occasions but did not fire on them until the Libyan aircraft fired at the F-14's.

MALAYSIA

Aug. 9—In Kuala Lumpur, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang meets with newly elected Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammad; Mahathir succeeded retiring Prime Minister Hussein Onn last month.

MAURITANIA

Aug. 26—The government denies a charge (made by the Anti-Slavery Society of London to the U.N. Human Rights Commission) that government officials are keeping slaves despite the official banning of slavery last year. The report claims that 100,000 people, about 10 percent of the population, are held in bondage.

MEXICO

Aug. 20—In Mexico City, government officials announce an agreement to sell the U.S. 110 million barrels of oil, valued at \$3.5 billion, for the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve; this is the first direct purchase by the U.S. Energy Department from a foreign government.

NICARAGUA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

PAKISTAN

Aug. 14—Military authorities release 8 political prisoners, leaders in the previous government.

Aug. 26—In Islamabad, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai P. Firyubin completes 3 days of talks with government officials; he reportedly fails to persuade Pakistan to ease its criticism of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

PANAMA

Aug. 1—Former chief of government and Commander in Chief of the National Guard General Omar Torrijos Herrera and 3 others are killed when their plane crashes in western Panama.

Aug. 24—It is reported that Colonel Florencio Floréz Aguilar has been appointed to replace Torrijos as head of the National Guard.

PERU

Aug. 17—Peru's 13,000 doctors, on strike for a 25-percent increase in pay, are joined by copper miners and bank employees with similar demands.

Aug. 31—In Lima, bombs explode at the U.S. embassy, the U.S. ambassador's residence, and at 4 companies with U.S. connections; no injuries are reported.

POLAND

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Aug. 5—A 2-day blockade of a downtown street intersection in Warsaw ends after workers stage a 2-hour strike to protest food shortages.

Aug. 8—The Warsaw Pact's Soviet commander in chief meets with Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Aug. 9—Ignoring warnings from Solidarity, some 5,000 protest food shortages in a street march in Krosno.

Aug. 11—at the 1st meeting of the new central committee of the Communist party of Poland, party leader Stanislaw Kania warns that more street demonstrations may lead to "the greatest national tragedy."

Aug. 12—The national leadership of Solidarity ends a 3-day meeting in Gdansk and asks its members to halt strikes and demonstrations over food ration cuts until the union's first national convention in October.

Aug. 18—Striking printers close or disrupt most newspapers; they are demanding regular access to newspapers, television and radio.

Aug. 20—Most of the nation's printers end their 2-day shutdown.

Aug. 29—in talks between government officials and Solidarity leaders, the government offers to provide Solidarity with 2 half hours of prime television time next week. Solidarity is demanding more access to the state-controlled media.

PORTUGAL

Aug. 10—Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão resigns from office because, he says, criticism from fellow members of the Social Democratic party has "made it impossible" to govern.

Aug. 16—the 74-member National Council of the Social Democratic party gives former Prime Minister Balsemão a 58 to 1 vote of confidence and asks him to resume as Prime Minister.

Aug. 23—Leader of the conservative Christian Democrats Diogo Freitas do Amaral agrees to join the coalition government as Deputy Prime Minister.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl, Middle East, OPEC; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SENEGAL

(See *Gambia*)

SIERRA LEONE

Aug. 14—for the 1st time in their history, union leaders call a general strike to protest high prices and rents and food shortages.

SOMALIA

Aug. 25—Following Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with South Yemen and Ethiopia last week, Somalia breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Angola*)

Aug. 10—Major General Charles Lloyd, commander of South Africa's forces in Namibia (South-West Africa), says that Soviet arms are being used in southern Angola to protect SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization) guerrillas.

Aug. 11—Hours before a scheduled visit by a U.S. congressional delegation, police raid and burn a black squatter camp in Nyanga township outside Cape Town.

Aug. 12—in Cape Town, Finance Minister Owen Horwood reveals that the government's defense budget is 40 percent higher in 1981-1982 because of "external threats."

Aug. 19—in Nyanga township, police round up and arrest 2,000 people in preparation for removing them to the Transkei, a rural black homeland.

The Supreme Court sentences 3 members of the outlawed ANC (African National Congress) to hang for their part in recent sabotage attempts.

SPAIN

Aug. 1—Santiago Carrillo is reelected as leader of the Spanish Communist party.

SRI LANKA

Aug. 17—President J. R. Jayewardene declares a national state of emergency in an effort to cope with ethnic rioting.

UGANDA

Aug. 20—In his first major speech in 3 months, President Milton Obote tells the ruling Uganda People's Congress party that the "cult of rampant killings" must end.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Czechoslovakia; Pakistan; Poland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 6—The U.S. Defense Department says that 17 major Soviet ships and between 52 and 54 smaller ships are taking part in the Soviet naval exercises in the Baltic Sea.

Aug. 9—Tass, the official press agency, declares that the U.S. decision to make neutron weapons is "designed to bring the world closer to a nuclear catastrophe."

Aug. 12—Tass reports that a Soviet post on the Pakistani border has been attacked by 700 Afghani guerrillas; 43 regular Afghani soldiers have defeated the rebels.

Aug. 15—After meeting in the Crimea with Polish leaders, the government issues a conciliatory communiqué noting Soviet support for the Polish government, promising the deferment of Polish debts to the U.S.S.R., and pledging substantial economic aid to Poland.

UNITED KINGDOM

Northern Ireland

Aug. 1—A 7th hunger striker dies in Maze Prison.

Aug. 2—An 8th hunger striker dies in Maze Prison.

Aug. 5—Within the space of 1 hour, terrorists set off bombs in 6 cities and towns in Northern Ireland.

Aug. 8—A 9th hunger striker dies in Maze Prison.

Aug. 9—After the death of the 9th hunger striker, widespread rioting in Belfast claims 2 civilian lives.

Aug. 20—A 10th hunger striker, Michael Devine, dies.

Aug. 21—In yesterday's parliamentary by-election to replace Robert Sands (who died in Maze prison as a result of a hunger strike), Owen Carron, a hard-line supporter of the Irish Republican Army, wins the seat.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Aug. 3—Defying an injunction issued by U.S. district court Judge Harold Greene ordering the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) members to return to work, PATCO members begin an illegal strike; they are federal employees and have signed an agreement not to strike.

President Ronald Reagan warns striking PATCO members that they are violating the law and face dismissal if they do not return to work within 48 hours. The nation's airlines continue to fly 75 percent of their flights with supervisory, military and non-striking controllers handling the load; about 2,000 controllers are not union members.

Aug. 5—The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) begins sending dismissal notices to 12,000 striking air traffic controllers; some union leaders are jailed for contempt of court.

Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Anne M. Gorsuch outlines President Reagan's proposals for revisions of the Clean Air Act; auto emission controls and some other controls will be relaxed.

Three dead Mediterranean fruit flies are found in a Tampa, Florida, trap; it is feared that the flies have spread to Florida from California. (See also *Japan*.)

Aug. 7—Secretary of the Interior James Watt announces the postponement of the sale of oil-drilling leases off the northern California coast until 1983 because of the July 27 decision of the U.S. district court in Los Angeles blocking the sale of leases.

Aug. 11—The National Governors Association ends its 73d annual meeting in Atlantic City; the governors agree to resist President Reagan's effort to shift "responsibility for such costly income maintenance programs as Medicaid" to the states.

Aug. 12—Canadian air traffic controllers end their 2-day boycott of flights to and from the U.S. and return to work; boycotting Gander, Newfoundland, controllers severely disrupted North Atlantic air travel.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service moves the 1st 125 Haitian refugees from Florida to a former naval base at Juana Diaz, Puerto Rico.

Aug. 13—Meeting in Amsterdam, the 61-country international air controllers' organization refuses to boycott to support U.S. controllers and sends a message to President Reagan asking for the resumption of talks with the striking and dismissed U.S. controllers.

Aug. 17—In its final report, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recommends \$2 billion in federal aid to states to help build prisons, stricter bail laws and other measures designed to combat violent crime.

The FAA begins to accept applications for air traffic controller jobs to rebuild its controller force.

Aug. 18—Vacationing in California, President Reagan confers on additional budget cuts with Budget Director David A. Stockman and Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan; Reagan has been advised that the administration must recommend at least \$75 billion in additional cuts to wipe out the federal deficit by 1984.

The General Accounting Office, Congress's investigative arm, says that stricter federal inspection of meat and poultry slaughter plants is necessary; surprise visits have revealed that one-fourth of the plants visited violate federal standards.

Aug. 19—In Atlanta, U.S. district court Judge Marvin H. Shoob says that 365 Cuban refugees who have been detained in the Atlanta area for over a year because they lack necessary papers are free to leave as soon as they are assigned sponsors. Fearing government action to deport the refugees, Judge Shoob issues a temporary restraining order prohibiting the government from deporting any of the 1,800 Cuban refugees being held in the Atlanta area.

John J. O'Donnell, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, says that the nation's air lanes are safe despite the air traffic controllers' strike.

Aug. 20—Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis refuses to resume negotiations with the striking air controllers.

Aug. 23—Meeting in Amsterdam, the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations calls for a resumption of negotiations; the association agrees to use labor action in support of the U.S. controllers, if necessary.

Civil Rights

Aug. 27—The Justice Department abandons its efforts to force cross-district school desegregation between Houston and 22 Houston suburbs.

Aug. 28—The Justice Department reverses its July 21 position and says that it is satisfied with the Chicago school board's proposals to desegregate its schools.

Economy

Aug. 7—The Labor Department reports that the nation's

unemployment rate fell to 7 percent in July.

Aug. 14—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.4 percent in July.

Aug. 19—The Commerce Department revises its figures for the 2d quarter gross national product; it reports that for the April-June, 1981, period the GNP declined at an annual rate of 2.4 percent rather than at the 1.9 percent rate reported earlier.

Aug. 20—The Census Bureau reports that real or "inflation adjusted" personal income of U.S. families dropped by 5.5 percent in 1980, the biggest drop since 1947.

Aug. 25—The Labor Department reports its consumer price index rose by 1.2 percent in July, the highest rate of inflation in 16 months.

Aug. 28—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators fell 0.1 percent in July, the 3d consecutive month of decline.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl., Middle East; Angola; Egypt; El Salvador; Germany, West; Israel; Korea, North; Libya; U.S.S.R.*)

Aug. 5—Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Myer Rashish says that the U.S. is opposed to sharing existing economic resources with the poor third world countries; he says that they must develop their own "viable growth."

U.S. trade representative Bill Brock and Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Boris Gordeyev sign an agreement in Vienna to extend for 1 year the existing 5-year grain purchase agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 6—President Reagan and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat conclude 2 days of talks in Washington, D.C.

Aug. 11—Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders arrives in Managua for the 1st high-level talks between U.S. and Nicaraguan officials since the current administration took office in the U.S.

Aug. 17—According to an announcement by Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr., President Reagan has "lifted the suspension of military aircraft deliveries to Israel." 16 F-15 and F-16 jet fighters will be released for shipment.

The Treasury Department reports the transfer of more than \$2 billion in once-frozen Iranian assets to the Settlement Bank of the Netherlands in Amsterdam; half of the money will be held as security for American claims against Iran that are being arbitrated by an international tribunal.

Aug. 18—The President names veteran diplomat Arthur A. Hartman U.S. ambassador to Moscow and investment banker Evan Galbraith U.S. ambassador to France.

Aug. 24—Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance James L. Buckley presents Congress with the administration's proposal to sell Saudi Arabia 5 radar planes (Airborne Warning and Control Systems, AWACS), 62 F-15 fighters, and other military supplies, in a package valued at \$8.5 billion.

Aug. 29—Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker says the U.S. will not "be forced to align [itself] with one side or another" in the dispute between black Africa and South Africa; he says the U.S. must remain neutral in order to maintain communications with all parties.

Labor and Industry

Aug. 5—The Dupont Company announces that it has acquired a controlling interest in Conoco, Inc.; for \$7.5 billion in stock and cash, in the most expensive corporate takeover in U.S. history.

Aug. 21—Ford Motor Company spokesman Jerry Sloan denies that there is any change in its safety recall policy; he says Ford will continue to make public announcements of its recalls. Ford and the other automobile manufacturers have recently been criticized for notifying car owners individually rather than publicly of safety defects.

Aug. 24—Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan announces new regulations relaxing antidiscrimination requirements for most federal contractors and reducing affirmative action procedures for most contractors; the new regulations go into effect in 90 days.

Legislation

Aug. 3—in a 67-8 vote, the Senate approves President Reagan's tax bill; among other provisions the law will cut personal income taxes 25 percent over a 3-year period.

Aug. 4—in a 282-95 vote, the House approves the tax-cut bill; it now goes to President Reagan for his signature.

Aug. 13—Taking time out from a month's vacation, President Reagan signs the tax-cut bill.

Military

Aug. 8—White House sources report that President Reagan has ordered the production of neutron weapons; the weapons are to be stockpiled in the U.S.

Aug. 10—Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger says that neutron weapons are already in production, using components already manufactured.

Aug. 24—Deputy White House press secretary Larry Speakes says that President Reagan has made a "preliminary" decision on housing the new MX missile system that excludes placing missiles on specially equipped planes.

Political Scandal

Aug. 24—The Senate Select Committee on Ethics recommends unanimously that Senator Harrison A. Williams Jr. (D., N.J.) be expelled from the Senate because of his "ethically repugnant" conduct in the Abscam undercover investigation.

URUGUAY

Aug. 1—The National Council approves General Gregorio Alvarez as President.

VATICAN

Aug. 5—Pope John Paul II undergoes surgery to restore normal function to his intestine; this is the final surgery he needs to mend a wound he suffered May 13 at the hands of a would-be assassin.

Aug. 15—Pope John Paul II is declared "clinically recovered" and leaves the hospital in Rome.

YUGOSLAVIA


Aug. 2—it is reported in Belgrade that 12 ethnic Albanians involved in disorders in Kosovo province have been sentenced to jail terms; about 150 others await trial.

Aug. 8—the Yugoslav press agency reports that 21 university teachers and students have been sentenced to prison for taking part in the riots in Kosovo province.

ZIMBABWE

Aug. 7—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe appoints General Andrew Maclean, a white, as overall commander of the military forces.

Aug. 13—Education Minister Dzingai Mutumbuka says that private white "community schools" will be closed by the government at the end of August.



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